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ARTICLES
IN RE EXXON VALDEZ:
APPLICATION OF DUE PROCESS
CONSTRAINTS ON PUNITIVE
DAMAGES AWARDS
JOSEPH J. CHAMBERS*
This Article examines the application of due process restraints on
punitive damages as articulated by the United States Supreme
Court, in the context of the $5 billion punitive damage award
stemming from the Exxon Valdez oil spill. The author asserts that
the Exxon Valdez punitive damages case and its extensive appellate history demonstrate the practical application problems that
have arisen under the Supreme Court’s due process analysis of
punitive damages awards. The author concludes that the Supreme
Court’s due process review of punitive damages awards has failed
to produce predictability and uniformity in such awards and will
likely be followed by additional guidelines to be set forth by the
Court in future cases.

I. INTRODUCTION
On March 24, 1989, the supertanker Exxon Valdez ran
aground on Bligh Reef and spilled approximately eleven million
1
gallons of oil into Prince William Sound. Wind, ocean currents,
Copyright © 2003 by Joseph J. Chambers. This Article is also available on the
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1. Doug O’Harra, Sound Battles Back, But Threats Linger; Exxon Valdez –
Legacy of a Spill, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Mar. 21, 1999, at 1M.

195

111103 CHAMBERS.DOC

196

12/29/03 2:00 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[20:2

and tidal action spread the oil until it eventually covered more than
thirteen-hundred miles of the Alaskan coastline and caused severe
2
environmental, social, and economic damage. The Exxon Corporation conducted a cleanup operation aimed at removing the oil
3
from the shore, spending over $2.1 billion in the effort. In addition, Exxon initiated a claims settlement program, voluntarily
paying out $300 million to compensate those persons who were
4
economically harmed by the spill. However, the spill precipitated
numerous lawsuits which were filed in both state and federal court
5
by both public and private litigants.
In In re Exxon Valdez, commercial and subsistence fishermen,
landowners, and others harmed by the oil spill filed a class action
6
suit to recover economic damages. Exxon admitted that its negligence had caused the oil spill; however, the jury found that Exxon
had been reckless, which opened the door to liability for punitive
7
damages. In September 1994, the jury delivered a $5 billion puni-

2. Doug O’Harra, Researchers Track Crude’s Wandering Trail; Spread of Oil
from the Exxon Valdez, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Mar. 21, 1999, at 5M; Exxon
Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, Oil Spill Facts: Spill Prevention and Response, at
http://www.oilspill.state.ak.us/facts/prevention.html (last visited on Sept. 22, 2003).
3. Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, Oil Spill Facts: Questions and Answers, at http://www.oilspill.state.ak.us/facts/qanda.html (last visited on Sept. 22,
2003). In this Article, “Exxon” refers collectively to the Exxon Corporation and
Exxon Shipping Company. Exxon Shipping Company was renamed Sea River
Shipping. Id. The Exxon Valdez was renamed the Sea River Mediterrranean. Id.
A provision of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 bars any vessel which has spilled
more than one million gallons of oil after March 22, 1989 from Prince William
Sound—a provision which was obviously written to include the Exxon Valdez. See
33 U.S.C. § 2737 (1994). In 1999, Exxon merged with Mobil to become ExxonMobil, one of the largest private oil companies in the world. Exxon Mobil Corporation Announces New Global Structure, PR NEWSWIRE, Dec. 2, 1999.
4. In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1223 (9th Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Exxon
II]. Exxon I refers to the jury trial verdict awarding $5 billion in punitive damages
award.
5. Robert E. Jenkins & Jill Watry Kastner, Running Aground in a Sea of
Complex Litigation: A Case Comment On the Exxon Valdez Litigation, 18 UCLA
J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 151, 155-59 (2000) (“The Exxon Valdez litigation began
with more than 52,000 plaintiffs and 84 law firms filing more than 200 suits in both
state and federal court in the first year alone . . . . [B]y September 1991, 252 private lawsuits were filed seeking a total of $59 billion.”).
6. Exxon II, 270 F.3d at 1225.
7. Id.
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tive damages verdict against Exxon.8 At the time, the award was
9
the largest in United States history.
In November 2001, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit vacated the $5 billion punitive damages jury verdict
10
and directed the district court to reduce the award on remand.
Specifically, the Ninth Circuit held that while punitive damages
were permissible, the $5 billion award was so large that it deprived
Exxon of fair notice that such a large verdict could be imposed, and
11
was therefore excessive under the Due Process Clause. In its
holding, the court relied upon two recent decisions of the United

8. Jenkins & Kastner, supra note 5, at 192.
9. 270 F.3d at 1238; Jenkins & Kastner, supra note 5, at 192. The $5 billion
award against Exxon does not seem quite so shocking in comparison to the July
2000 award of $144 billion in the Florida class action suit against cigarette manufacturers. See infra note 27. For a description of the due process excessiveness issues raised in the Florida tobacco litigation, see Virginia A. Canipe, Crossing the
Excessiveness Line: The Implications of BMW v. Gore On Multi-Billion Dollar
Tobacco Litigation Punitive Damages, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1157 (2001). See
also Meghan A. Crowley, From Punishment to Annihilation: Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.—No More Butts—Punitive Damages Have Gone Too Far, 34
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1513 (2001).
10. Exxon II, 270 F.3d at 1246-47.
11. See id. at 1238-47 (discussing constitutional due process requirements
stipulating that punitive damages awards cannot be so grossly excessive as to deny
fair notice). For an explanation of the Due Process Clause and the distinction between the procedural and substantive due process rights implicated by punitive
damages awards, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES
AND POLICIES (1997), stating:
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, respectively, provide that neither the United States nor state governments shall deprive any person
“of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” This clause has
been interpreted as imposing two separate limits on government, usually
called “procedural due process” and “substantive due process.”
Procedural due process, as the phrase implies, refers to the procedures
that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property . . . .
Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes, asks whether the government has an adequate reason for taking away a person’s life, liberty,
or property . . .
[An] example of the distinction between procedural and substantive due
process can be found in challenges to large punitive damage awards.
Procedural due process requires that there be safeguards such as instructions to the jury to guide their discretion, and judicial review to assure
the reasonableness of the awards. Substantive due process prevents excessive punitive damages awards, regardless of the procedures followed.
Id. at 419-20.
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States Supreme Court—BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore12 and
13
Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., which together established criteria for judicial review of jury awards for punitive damages. The Ninth Circuit concluded: “The $5 billion punitive damages award is too high to withstand the review we are
14
required to give it under BMW and Cooper. It must be reduced.”
In December 2002, the district court on remand remitted $1
15
billion of the punitive damages award. While the district court
acknowledged that it had to reduce the award, it nonetheless rejected the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that the original award was
16
Instead, the district
excessive under the Due Process Clause.
court found that the “award was justified by the facts of the case
and is not grossly excessive so as to deprive Exxon of fair notice—
17
its right to due process.”
Exxon appealed to the Ninth Circuit, challenging the district
court’s decision to set the punitive damages award at $4 billion. On
August 18, 2003, before the parties even submitted appellate briefs,
the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case so that the district court could reconsider its decision in light of State Farm Automobile Insurance Company v.
18
19
Campbell, decided by the Supreme Court in April of 2003. Before the end of 2003, the parties will submit briefs and present oral
arguments to the district court regarding whether State Farm re20
quires a greater reduction in the punitive damages award.
The focus of this Article is the application of the Supreme
Court’s recently identified due process constraints on punitive
damages awards in In re Exxon Valdez. First, Part II will review
the Supreme Court’s emerging substantive due process “fair notice

12. 517 U.S. 559 (1996). While the Ninth Circuit and the district court of
Alaska use “BMW” as shorthand when referring to the case, some courts—most
notably the Supreme Court—often refer to the case as “Gore.” This Article uses
“BMW” as shorthand.
13. 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
14. Exxon II, 270 F.3d at 1246.
15. In re Exxon Valdez, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1068 (D. Alaska 2002) [hereinafter Exxon III].
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003).
19. Sea Hawk Seafoods, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., No. 03-35166, at 1 (9th Cir. Aug.
18, 2003) (Order) [hereinafter Exxon IV].
20. In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-0095-CV, at 2 (D. Alaska Aug. 26, 2003)
(Order for Further Proceedings on Punitive Damages Award) [hereinafter Exxon
V].
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excessiveness” jurisprudence regarding punitive damages awards
culminating in BMW, Cooper, and State Farm.
Next, Part III will summarize the background of In re Exxon
Valdez. This Part will describe the spill and its aftermath, including
Exxon’s $2.1 billion clean-up effort. In addition, Part III will discuss the civil and criminal penalties imposed on Exxon after the
spill. Part III will also summarize the spill-related litigation relevant to In re Exxon Valdez, including the $900 million settlement
Exxon paid to government trustees to compensate for the damages
done to public natural resources, as well as a failed class action suit
filed by outdoor recreation enthusiasts seeking to recover damages
for their lost use of natural resources.
Part IV will summarize the parties’ arguments on the substantive due process challenge to the punitive damages award contained in their briefs to the Ninth Circuit and the district court.
Part IV will then discuss the Ninth Circuit’s decision to vacate the
verdict based on its analysis of BMW’s “fair notice excessiveness”
guideposts and remand the case to the district court with instructions to reduce the punitive damages award. Next, Part IV will examine the district court’s decision to reduce the punitive damages
award against Exxon by $1 billion. Finally, Part IV will discuss the
Ninth Circuit’s order that vacated the reduced award and remanded the case so that the district court could reconsider the punitive damages award in light of State Farm.
Part V will discuss the following questions regarding due process excessiveness review that were raised by In re Exxon Valdez:
(1) Do BMW’s guideposts lead to uniformity?; (2) Is de novo review appropriate?; (3) Does excessiveness review needlessly undermine the role of the jury?; (4) Should additional guideposts be
considered?; and (5) Should a defendant’s expenses be used to
mitigate the amount of punitive damages? This Article concludes
that application of due process excessiveness review does not lend
itself to uniformity and that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence will
require additional guidelines in order to settle the various problematic issues. In addition, Part V will discuss two important,
evolving issues—extraterritoriality and multiple punishments—that
were not raised by In re Exxon Valdez, but which have led the Supreme Court to further constrain punitive damages awards in State
Farm.

111103 CHAMBERS.DOC

200

12/29/03 2:00 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[20:2

II. PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS & SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS “FAIR NOTICE EXCESSIVENESS” CHALLENGES
A. Punitive Damages Awards
While compensatory damages are meant only to compensate
the plaintiff for actual loss or injury, the aim of punitive damages is
to disgorge from the defendant “any profit gained through misconduct and to inflict a financial harm . . . sufficiently severe to dissuade the defendant and others from engaging in the conduct at is21
sue.” In other words, punitive damages are awarded “to punish
22
reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence.” They
23
have been described as “private fines levied by civil juries.” By
the nineteenth century these fines had become a “well-established
principle of the common law” and were sanctioned by the Supreme
24
Court in Day v. Woodworth. However, even then they proved
25
Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist once observed
controversial.
that “the doctrine of punitive damages has been vigorously criti26
cized throughout the Nation’s history.”
During the past decade, the perception among some observers
that out-of-control juries frequently award plaintiffs everincreasing punitive damages has sparked a movement for tort re27
form. Other observers contend that the punitive damages crisis is

21. Daniel M. Weddle, A Practitioner’s Guide to Litigating Punitive Damages
After BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 661, 662 (1999).
22. Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 87 (1988) (O’Connor,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974)).
23. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350.
24. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851).
25. Id. (acknowledging the controversial nature of punitive damages awards,
but accepting them as a longstanding fixture of the common law).
26. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 58 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
27. See Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens & Joseph P. Mastrosimone,
Reining in Punitive Damages “Run Wild”: Proposals for Reform By Courts And
Legislatures, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 1003, 1010, 1034-35 (1999) (arguing that reform is
needed to address the chilling effect of punitive damages awards and recommending legislation and judicial constraints on punitive damages awards); see also
George L. Priest, The Problem and Efforts to Understand It, in PUNITIVE
DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE 1 (2002) (“Over the past two decades, our country has experienced a dramatic increase in the incidence and magnitude of punitive damages verdicts rendered by juries in civil litigation. Perhaps the most extraordinary example is the July 2000 award of $144.8 billion in the Florida class
action brought against cigarette manufacturers. But there are many other examples of huge verdicts . . . .”); Crowley, supra note 9, at 1515, 1531 (describing an
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a politically-driven myth based upon anecdotal evidence derived
28
only from a few well-known outlier cases. Nonetheless, many
state legislatures have responded to calls for tort reform by passing
29
legislation curtailing punitive damages awards. In addition, state
courts are increasingly receptive to constitutional challenges to punitive damages awards and have articulated factors—similar to
those contained in BMW—designed to facilitate judicial review and
30
control of punitive damages awards.

increase in punitive damages awards against corporate defendants and suggesting
reforms to “restore balance, fairness, and predictability to punitive damages law”).
28. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Damage Awards in Perspective: Behind The
Headline-Grabbing Awards in Exxon Valdez and Engle, 36 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 1129, 1134–39 (2001) (showing no significant increase in punitive damages
awards between 1991 and 1996); Lori Woodward O’Connell, The Case for Continuing to Award Punitive Damages, 36 TORT & INS. L. J. 873, 883-89 (2001) (arguing that punitive damages awards are not increasing in number or frequency
and are not excessively high or unpredictable); Marc Galanter, Real World Torts:
An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1112-40 (1996) (refuting general
claims of a nationwide punitive damages crisis); Michael Rustad, Nationalizing
Tort Law: The Republican Attack on Women, Blue Collar Workers and Consumers, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 673, 687-704 (1996) (concluding that there is no empirical evidence of an emerging punitive damages crises); Richard C. Reuben, Plaintiffs Rarely Win Punitives, Study Says, 81 A.B.A. J. 26, 26 (Oct. 1995) (describing a
Department of Justice study that revealed that juries awarded punitive damages to
plaintiffs in only six percent of the cases they won, and awarded more than
$50,000 in only half of those cases); Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive Damages Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42
AM. U. L. REV. 1269 (1993) (refuting a punitive damages crisis and affirming
positive functions of punitive damages); Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth
and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1, 39-43 (1990) (refuting claim
of nationwide punitive damages problem).
29. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 614-19 (1996) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (providing an appendix to the dissenting opinion listing legislation
from sixteen states, which curtails punitive damages awards by various methods
including: “(1) caps on awards; (2) provisions for payments of sums to state agencies rather than to plaintiffs; and (3) mandatory bifurcated trials with separate
proceedings for punitive determinations”).
30. Although critical of the result, Justice Breyer’s description of the Alabama
Supreme Court’s review of the punitive damages award in BMW v. Gore provides
an example of how one state has actively developed methods for the judicial review of punitive damages. BMW, 517 U.S. at 586-93 (Breyer, J. concurring); see
also infra notes 135-152 and accompanying text discussing the factors the Utah
Supreme Court applied in State Farm.
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B. The Pre-BMW Decisions of the United States Supreme Court
While BMW, Cooper, and State Farm are correctly regarded as
landmark federal decisions, the Supreme Court had begun to identify constitutional constraints on punitive damages awards as early
as 1986. In these cases, the Court heard constitutional challenges
to awards and expressed concern that excessive punitive damages
awards jeopardized constitutional rights. However, the Court fell
short of imposing constitutional constraints to actually reduce punitive damages.
31
In Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie, while the punitive
damages award was set aside on other grounds, the Supreme Court
noted that the constitutionality of punitive damages raised “impor32
tant issues which, in an appropriate setting, must be resolved.”
33
Similarly, in Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, the Supreme Court did not reach the constitutional challenge to a punitive damages award because the issue had not been properly raised
34
In a concurring opinion, however, Justice
in the state court.
O’Connor expressed the view that unrestricted jury discretion over
punitive damages awards presented “serious” procedural due proc35
Additionally, in Browning-Ferris Industries of
ess problems.
36
Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., the Supreme Court held
that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment “does
37
not constrain an award of [punitive] damages in a civil suit.”
However, the Court reserved the question of whether the Due Process Clause is a constraint on jury discretion over punitive damages
38
awards even in the absence of statutory limits.
In 1991, the Supreme Court stated for the first time that the
39
Due Process Clause imposes a limit on punitive damages awards.
40
In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, the Court sought
to determine “whether the Due Process Clause render[ed] the pu-

31. 475 U.S. 813 (1986).
32. Id. at 816, 828-29.
33. 486 U.S. 71 (1988).
34. Id. at 76-80.
35. Id. at 87-88 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
36. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
37. Id. at 263-64.
38. Id. at 276-77.
39. THEODORE OLSON, ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO PUNITIVE
DAMAGES AFTER BMW V. GORE 4 (George C. Landrith ed., 1998).
40. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
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nitive damages award in [Haslip] constitutionally unacceptable.”41
To that end, the Court stated that “unlimited jury discretion . . . in
the fixing of punitive damages may invite extreme results that jar
42
The Court ultimately upheld
one’s constitutional sensibilities.”
the punitive damages award, finding that the award had an “under43
The
standable relationship to [the] compensatory damages.”
Court also declined to “draw a mathematical bright line” for the
judicial review of punitive damages awards that would fit every
case, but stated that “general concerns of reasonableness and adequate guidance from the court when the case is tried to a jury
44
properly enter into the constitutional calculus.” Thus, the Court
upheld a punitive damages award that was four times the amount
of the compensatory damages, stating that the award “may be close
to the line . . . [but] does not cross the line into the area of constitu45
tional impropriety.”
In TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,46 the
Court upheld a punitive damages award while reiterating that “reasonableness” is an important factor in determining whether a punitive damages award is so “grossly excessive” that it violates the
47
Due Process Clause. TXO involved a bad faith advancement of a
quitclaim by the defendant, TXO, in an effort to renegotiate an oil
48
and gas royalty arrangement with the plaintiff. The Court upheld
a punitive to compensatory ratio of 526 to one in part because of
49
the malicious and fraudulent conduct. In a concurring opinion,
however, Justice Kennedy warned that “[a] case involving vicarious
liability, negligence, or strict liability might present different is50
sues.”
Finally, in Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg,51 the Supreme Court
held that an Oregon law denying its courts the authority to reduce
or vacate excessive punitive damages awards violated the Due Pro52
cess Clause. The Court stated that “[j]udicial review of the size of

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
ment).
51.
52.

Id. at 18.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 22-24.
Id.
Id. at 23-24.
509 U.S. 443 (1993).
Id. at 453, 458.
Id. at 447-49.
Id. at 453, 462.
Id. at 469 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg512 U.S. 415 (1994).
Id. at 434-35.

111103 CHAMBERS.DOC

204

12/29/03 2:00 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[20:2

punitive damages awards has been a safeguard against excessive
53
verdicts for as long as punitive damages have been awarded.”
Together, these cases established the foundation for the Court’s
watershed decisions in BMW and Cooper.
C. BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore: The Fair Notice Excessiveness Guideposts
In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,54 the Supreme Court,
in a 5-4 decision, held that the amount of a punitive damages award
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
because it was so excessive that the defendant did not have fair no55
tice that it would be imposed. The majority opinion articulated
the following three guideposts to be considered when a court determines whether a punitive damages award is constitutionally excessive: (1) the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct; (2) the
ratio of the award to the harm inflicted on the plaintiff; and (3) the
difference between the award and the civil or criminal penalties
56
that could be imposed for comparable conduct. After applying
these guideposts to the facts, the Court vacated the punitive damages award and remanded the case to the Alabama Supreme
57
Court.
In BMW, the plaintiff, Dr. Gore, purchased a new car from an
authorized dealer, only to discover later that the car had been partially repainted by the national distributor, presumably after sus58
taining damage during transport. The defendant, BMW of North
America, had followed its practice of not disclosing pre-delivery
damage to dealers or customers when the cost of repair amounted
59
to less than three percent of the car’s retail price. In fact, the cost
of repainting the car purchased by Gore was about six hundred
60
dollars—only 1.5 percent of the retail price. BMW contended
that its non-disclosure policy was consistent with the laws of Alabama and of other states, while Gore alleged that the failure to dis53. Id. at 421.
54. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
55. Id. at 574-75. BMW has received significant attention from scholars and
the legal community. See generally, OLSON, supra note 39; George C. Freeman,
Jr., Constitutional Constraints on Punitive Damages and Other Monetary Punishments, 57 BUS. LAW. 587 (2002); Weddle, supra note 21, at 661; Sabrina C. Turner,
The Shadow of BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, WIS. L. REV. 427 (1998).
56. BMW, 517 U.S. at 575-85.
57. Id. at 585-86.
58. Id. at 563.
59. Id. at 563-64.
60. Id. at 564.
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close constituted suppression of a material fact amounting to
61
fraud.
Gore brought suit in Alabama State Court and claimed actual
damages of four thousand dollars, asserting that this was the decrease in the value of the car as a result of the damage and re62
painting. To support his claim for punitive damages, Gore presented evidence that BMW had sold nearly one thousand cars
63
nationwide without disclosing similar repairs. Gore claimed $4
million in punitive damages—the estimate of actual damage of four
64
thousand dollars per car, multiplied by one-thousand cars. The
jury then found that BMW had defrauded Gore and found the distributor liable for four thousand dollars in compensatory dam65
ages. The jury also determined that BMW’s non-disclosure policy
constituted “gross, oppressive or malicious” fraud and awarded $4
66
million in punitive damages.
On appeal, BMW claimed that the punitive damages award
67
was constitutionally excessive. This argument was rejected by the
Alabama Supreme Court, which applied a “fair notice excessive68
ness” inquiry based on a seven-factor test articulated in Green Oil
69
Co. v. Hornsby. The Alabama Supreme Court found BMW’s conduct reprehensible and concluded that the punitive damages award
had a “reasonable relationship” to the harm that had resulted from
70
BMW’s conduct. Nonetheless, the Alabama Supreme Court ordered a remittitur and cut the punitive damages award in half—to
$2 million—because it found that the jury had improperly relied
upon BMW’s acts outside of Alabama when determining the
71
amount of the award.

61. Id. at 563-65.
62. Id. at 564.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 565.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 566.
68. Id.
69. 539 So. 2d 218, 223-24 (Ala. 1989). Justice Breyer’s concurrence in BMW
lists the Green Oil factors that were part of the Alabama Supreme Court’s excessiveness inquiry, but argues that they were applied in a fashion that imposed little
actual constraint on the punitive damages. BMW, 517 U.S. at 589.
70. BMW, 517 U.S. at 567.
71. Id. Remittitur is a method by which a trial judge can review jury award for
excessiveness and order a new trial unless plaintiff accepts a reduction of the jury
award. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a) (granting trial judges the power to amend
judgments).
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After BMW appealed, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari, stating: “we believed that a review of this case
would help illuminate ‘the character of the standard that will iden72
tify unconstitutionally excessive awards’ of punitive damages.” At
the outset of its opinion, the Supreme Court noted: “Punitive damages may properly be imposed to further a State’s (sic) legitimate
interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repeti73
tion.” The Court then described a state’s interest in prohibiting
74
deceptive trade practices. Next, the Court stated that while Congress could enact a full disclosure requirement for the entire nation, no single state could impose such a policy outside of its own
75
jurisdiction. This also means that “a state may not impose economic sanctions on violators of its laws with the intent of changing
76
the tortfeasors’ lawful conduct in other States (sic).” The Court
thus concluded that Alabama lacked the authority to punish a party
through legislative fines or judicially imposed penalties for conduct
that occurred lawfully in another state and did not impact Alabama
77
or its residents. Therefore, the Court expressed approval of the
Alabama Supreme Court’s reduced punitive damages award that
78
was based only on BMW’s conduct in Alabama.
The Supreme Court concluded, however, that even though the
reduced punitive damage award was based only on BMW’s conduct
79
in Alabama, it was still “grossly excessive.” This conclusion triggered the Court’s own fair notice excessiveness inquiry: “[o]nly
when an award can fairly be categorized as ‘grossly excessive’ in
relation to these [state] interests [punishing unlawful conduct and
deterring its repetition] does it enter the zone of arbitrariness that
80
violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”

72. BMW, 517 U.S. at 568 (quoting Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415,
420 (1994)).
73. Id. The Court then stated that:
In our federal system, States necessarily have considerable flexibility in
determining the level of punitive damages that they will allow . . . in any
particular case. Most States . . . afford the jury similar latitude, requiring
only that the damages awarded be reasonably necessary to vindicate the
State’s legitimate interests in punishment and deterrence.
Id.
74. Id. at 568-70 (noting the “patchwork of rules” in existence throughout the
fifty states ranging from judicial processes to legislative acts).
75. Id. at 571.
76. Id. at 572.
77. Id. at 572-73.
78. Id. at 573-74.
79. Id. at 574.
80. Id. at 568.
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The BMW Court began its fair notice excessiveness inquiry by
noting that the Due Process Clause requires that a person receive
fair notice both of the conduct that will subject him to punishment
81
as well as the severity of the penalty that a state may impose. The
Court concluded that since “BMW did not receive adequate notice
of the magnitude of the sanction that Alabama might impose for
adhering to the nondisclosure policy,” the $2 million punitive dam82
ages award against it was grossly excessive.
In arriving at this conclusion, the Court applied the three
guideposts noted earlier to determine whether a punitive damages
83
award is reasonable or excessive. The first guidepost is the degree
84
of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct. The Court considered reprehensibility one of the most important indicia of reasonableness because of the longstanding emphasis placed on the “principle that punitive damages may not be ‘grossly out of proportion
85
to the severity of the offense.’” The Court held that BMW’s conduct was not sufficiently reprehensible to justify the punitive damages award in the case, pointing out that the non-disclosure policy
inflicted only economic harm and was not indicative of indifference
86
to, or reckless disregard for, the health and safety of others.
Next, the Court considered the second guidepost: the ratio between the punitive damages award and the actual harm to the
87
plaintiff. The Court termed the comparison between the punitive
damages award and the compensatory award “significant,” pointing out that “exemplary damages must bear a ‘reasonable relation88
ship’ to compensatory damages.” As in its previous decisions,
however, the Court was adamant in declining to set a rule as to the
permissible ratio beyond which punitive damages awards would
89
automatically be considered excessive. The Court stated: “[w]e
need not, and indeed we cannot, draw a mathematical bright line
between the constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally
90
unacceptable that would fit every case.” The Court also made

81. Id. at 574.
82. Id. at 574-75.
83. Id. at 575-85; see supra note 56 and accompanying text.
84. BMW, 517 U.S. at 575.
85. Id. at 575-76 (quoting Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 22
(1991)).
86. Id. at 576, 580. The Court also noted that BMW made no deliberate false
statement nor did it commit an act of affirmative misconduct. Id. at 579.
87. See id. at 580-83.
88. Id. at 580.
89. Id. at 582-83.
90. Id. (quoting Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18).
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clear its preference for an analysis based on a flexible reasonableness standard rather than a categorical approach, noting that particularly egregious acts that result in low compensatory damages
awards can still support high punitive damages awards, especially if
the “injury is hard to detect or the monetary value of noneconomic
91
harm might have been difficult to determine.”
The Court did, however, consider a mathematical analysis
when it reviewed the punitive-to-compensatory ratios previously
92
upheld and then compared them to the ratio in the case. The
Court stated that, in Haslip, it had called a punitive damages award
that was four times greater than the compensatory award “close to
93
the line” but had nonetheless upheld it. The Court also pointed
out that it upheld a ten to one ratio in TXO which took into account not only the actual harm, but also the potential harm of the
94
defendant’s conduct. In comparison, the Court observed that the
punitive damages award levied against BMW was thirty-five times
the total actual damages of the fourteen Alabama consumers who
had purchased repainted cars and five-hundred times the actual
95
damages awarded to the plaintiff. The Court then held that this
ratio was unacceptable because it was “dramatically greater” than
96
those it had previously upheld.
Finally, the BMW Court applied the third guidepost by comparing the punitive damages award with the civil and criminal sanc97
tions that could be imposed for similar misconduct and observing
that the maximum civil penalty for violation of the Alabama De98
ceptive Trade Practice Act was only two thousand dollars. The
Court reasoned that such relatively low civil penalties for similar
misconduct in other states did not provide fair notice that an of99
fender could be subject to a multimillion dollar penalty. This lack

91. Id. at 582-83. Some academics have proposed that punitive damages
should be based on the difficulty of detection of the harm. See, e.g., A. Mitchell
Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV.
L. REV. 869, 954 (1998) (arguing that punitive damages should only be awarded if
a tortfeasor has a chance of escaping liability for the harm caused and that the
amount of punitive damages should be the actual damages multiplied by a factor
representing the chance of escaping liability).
92. BMW, 517 U.S. at 581-82.
93. Id. at 581 (quoting Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23-24).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 582 n.35-37.
96. Id. at 582.
97. Id. at 583-85.
98. Id. at 584.
99. Id.
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of fair notice of the severity of the penalty constituted a violation
100
of the Due Process Clause.
Based on its analysis of the three fair notice excessiveness
guideposts, the Supreme Court held that the “grossly excessive
award imposed in this case transcend[ed] the constitutional limit”
and reversed the Alabama Supreme Court’s decision to set the pu101
The Court also found that
nitive damages award at $2 million.
102
BMW’s conduct did not justify such a large sanction. The Court
then remanded the case to the Alabama Supreme Court for their
“independent determination . . . of the award necessary to vindi103
cate the economic interests of Alabama consumers.”
D. Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.
104
In Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.,
the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the Due Process Clause pro-

100. Id. at 574; see also discussion supra at Part II.C.
101. BMW, 517 U.S. at 585-86.
102. Id. at 585. Justice Stevens authored the majority opinion in BMW, which
was joined by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer. Justice Breyer
also wrote a concurring opinion in which he criticized the Alabama Supreme
Court’s excessiveness inquiry, calling the standards used “vague” and concluding
that the standards imposed “no significant constraints” against arbitrary results
from the punitive damages award. Id. at 588. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice
Thomas, dissented, stating that the Fourteenth Amendment does not provide a
federal guarantee that punitive damages awards be reasonable and that federal
invalidation of a state-court punitive damage award is “an unjustified incursion
into the province of state governments.” Id. at 598-99. Regarding the majority’s
fair notice excessiveness guideposts, Scalia stated:
[T]he ‘guideposts’ mark a road to nowhere . . . . The Court has constructed a framework that does not genuinely constrain, that does
not inform state legislatures and lower courts—that does nothing at
all except confer an artificial air of doctrinal analysis upon its essentially ad hoc determination that this particular award of punitive
damages was not ‘fair’.
Id. at 605-06. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, also dissented,
stating that the majority “unnecessarily and unwisely venture[d] into territory traditionally within the State’s domain.” Id. at 607. Justice Ginsburg pointed out that
since the Alabama court had reviewed the jury’s award by applying factors previously approved by the Supreme Court, its decision was “entitled to a presumption
of legitimacy.” Id. at 611.
103. Id. at 586. On remand the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the order
denying a new trial on the condition of the plaintiff’s acceptance of a remittitur
reducing the punitive damages award to $50,000. BMW of N. Am., Inc., v. Gore,
701 So. 2d 507, 515 (Ala. 1997).
104. 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
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hibits the imposition of grossly excessive punishments on tortfea105
sors. The Court echoed its decision in BMW and instructed lower
courts to evaluate due process challenges to punitive damage
106
awards by use of the three fair notice excessiveness guideposts.
Remarkably, the Cooper Court also held that “courts of appeal
should apply a de novo standard of review when passing on district
courts’ determinations of the constitutionality of punitive damages
107
awards.”
In Cooper, Leatherman Tool Group sued Cooper Industries in
United States District Court after Cooper created marketing materials that used modified photographs of a Leatherman pocket tool
108
for the purpose of advertising its own similar product. The jury
found Cooper guilty of trade dress infringement and unfair competition and awarded Leatherman $50,000 in compensatory dam109
The jury also found that Cooper had “acted with a conages.
scious indifference to Leatherman’s rights” and awarded $4.5
110
The district court considered, but
million in punitive damages.
ultimately denied, any reduction based on a fair notice excessive111
ness inquiry utilizing the BMW excessiveness guideposts.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the pu112
The Ninth Circuit reviewed the district
nitive damages award.
court’s finding that the punitive damages award was “proportional
and fair given the nature of the conduct, the evidence of intentional
passing off, and the size of an award necessary to deter an entity of
113
The Ninth Circuit then held that the district
Cooper’s size.”
court’s decision to leave the punitive damages award intact was not
114
an abuse of discretion.
105. Id. at 434. The Cooper Court also shed light on the relationship between
due process excessiveness of punitive damages and the Eighth Amendment. Id. at
433-44. The Court stated that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “makes the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against excessive fines and
cruel and unusual punishments applicable to the States.” Id.
106. Id. at 440.
107. Id. at 436.
108. Id. at 427-28. Leatherman alleged trade dress infringement under the federal Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2003), and common-law false advertising
and unfair competition. Id. at 428.
109. Id. at 429.
110. Id. The jury responded to an interrogatory that asked whether Cooper
had acted with malice. Id. After answering in the affirmative, the jury was asked
to determine the amount of the punitive damages award. Id.
111. Id. at 429.
112. Id. at 430.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 431.
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The Supreme Court granted Cooper’s petition for a writ of
certiorari to resolve a circuit split regarding the standard of review
to be applied when an appellate court reviews a district court’s de115
termination of the constitutionality of a punitive damages award.
The Supreme Court initially held that de novo review—not abuse
116
of discretion—is the proper standard. The Court reasoned that
while the jury’s assessment of the amount necessary to compensate
a plaintiff for an injury is a factual determination, the jury’s award
of punitive damages does not constitute a finding of “fact” but is
117
instead an expression of moral condemnation. Through this reasoning, the Court was able to overcome the Seventh Amendment’s
118
prohibition of the re-examination of facts found by a jury.
The Court further justified its holding by stating that considerations of institutional competence when applying the three BMW
guideposts “fail to tip the balance in favor of deferential appellate
review,” therefore favoring the use of an abuse of discretion stan119
By providing its own fair notice excessiveness inquiry
dard.
based on the BMW guideposts, the Court illustrated that a de novo
review could have led the appellate court to a different conclu120
sion. The Court then remanded the case so that the Ninth Circuit
could apply the BMW fair notice excessiveness guideposts under
121
the more demanding de novo standard. Applying the heightened

115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 432, 437.
118. Id. at 437. The Court stated: “Because the jury’s award of punitive damages does not constitute a finding of ‘fact,’ appellate review of the district court’s
determination that an award is consistent with due process does not implicate the
Seventh Amendment concerns raised by respondent and its amicus.” Id. The
Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the common law.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
119. Cooper, 532 U.S. at 440.
120. Id. at 441-42.
121. Id. at 443. Justice Stevens delivered the majority opinion in Cooper, which
was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter,
Thomas and Breyer. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion in which he stated
that, if given the opportunity, he would vote to overrule BMW because he does
not believe that the Constitution constrains the size of punitive damages awards.
Id. Similarly, Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment concerning de novo review,
but stated that he “was . . . of the view that excessive punitive damages do not
violate the Due Process Clause.” Id.
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standard, the Ninth Circuit reduced the $4.5 million punitive dam122
ages award to $500,000.
E. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell
As the Supreme Court expanded its due process fair notice excessiveness jurisprudence, it established guideposts for courts to
use when determining whether a punitive damages award is consti123
tutionally excessive and established that a de novo standard
should be used to review lower courts’ decisions regarding the con124
Other quesstitutionality of a given punitive damages award.
tions—such as whether a state can punish a defendant for unlawful
out-of-state conduct, whether evidence of bad conduct unrelated to
that which harmed the plaintiff can be used to show reprehensibility, and whether a defendant’s wealth is a proper factor for courts
to use when reviewing the constitutionality of a punitive damages
award—remained largely unanswered until State Farm Mutual
125
Automobile Insurance Company v. Campbell.
In State Farm, the defendant insurance company appealed the
decision of the Utah Supreme Court to reinstate a jury’s $145 million punitive damages award after the trial judge had reduced the
126
After applying the
award to $25 million through a remittitur.
BMW guideposts to the facts of the case, the United States Supreme Court held that the punitive damages award was constitutionally excessive and remanded the case so that the Utah Supreme
127
Court could determine an appropriate lesser amount. The Court
stated that the punitive damages award “was neither reasonable
nor proportionate to the wrong committed, and it was an irrational
128
and arbitrary deprivation of the property of the defendant.”
In State Farm, after a severe automobile accident, Campbell,
who was insured by State Farm, faced two civil actions, including a
wrongful death suit. Even though State Farm had evidence that
Campbell caused the accident, it chose not to settle for $25,000—
129
When the case against
the amount of Campbell’s policy limits.
Campbell went to trial, the jury found him at fault for the accident

122. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 285 F.3d 1146, 1152
(9th Cir. 2002).
123. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574-86 (1996).
124. Cooper, 532 U.S. at 436.
125. 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003).
126. Id. at 1519.
127. Id. at 1526.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1518.
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and awarded the plaintiffs more than $185,000 in damages.130 State
Farm, despite previous assurances to Campbell that he would have
no liability for the accident, made it clear that it did not intend to
pay the amount of the judgment against Campbell in excess of his
131
policy limit.
Campbell filed suit against State Farm, alleging bad faith,
132
fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. During the
trial, Campbell introduced evidence that State Farm’s decision to
take the accident case to trial was part of a company-wide scheme
to cap payouts on claims and that State Farm had engaged in nu133
merous fraudulent practices as part of its scheme. The jury found
that State Farm had acted in bad faith and, because State Farm’s
conduct was “intentional and sufficiently egregious to warrant punitive damages,” it granted an award of $2.6 million in compensa134
The trial
tory damages and $145 million in punitive damages.
court denied State Farm’s motions for a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict and for a new trial, but ordered a remittitur of both
damage awards, which reduced the compensatory damages award
135
to $1 million and the punitive damages award to $25 million.
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court applied a punitive damages award excessiveness inquiry based on its own jurisprudence as
well as the BMW guideposts. First, the court noted that pursuant
to Cooper, it was required to review the trial court’s decision on the
136
punitive damages award de novo. The court applied the following seven factors that were previously articulated in Crookston v.
137
Fire Insurance Exchange:
1) the relative wealth of the defendant; 2) the nature of the alleged misconduct; 3) the facts and circumstances surrounding
such misconduct; 4) the effect of the conduct on the lives of the
plaintiff and others; 5) the probability of future recurrence of the
conduct; 6) the relationship of the parties; and 7) the amount of
138
actual damages awarded.

The Utah court observed that the trial court had based its remittitur solely on the last factor and took issue only with the ratio of the

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
2001).
136.
137.
138.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1519.
Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134, 1143 (Utah
Id. at 1143-44.
817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991).
Campbell, 65 P.3d at 1146.
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punitive damages to the actual damage award.139 After an extensive analysis of each factor, the Utah court held that the jury’s punitive damages award was not excessive under any of the factors
140
and held that the trial court’s remittitur was not required.
The Utah court then turned to an excessiveness inquiry based
141
on the BMW guideposts. The court recognized that BMW’s reprehensibility guidepost was similar to the factors in Crookston re142
Aclating to the nature and circumstances of the misconduct.
cordingly, it chose to incorporate its earlier analysis, concluding
that the reprehensibility guidepost did not favor a finding that the
143
punitive damages award was excessive.
The Utah court next considered the BMW ratio guidepost,
noting that since there is no categorical rule on the permissible ratio of the compensatory damages award to the punitive damages
award, courts must instead determine the reasonableness of the ra144
tio based on the facts and circumstances of each case. The court
concluded that a high ratio was proper in the case because “State
Farm’s fraudulent conduct ha[d] been a consistent way of doing
business for the last twenty years, directed specifically at some of
145
The Utah court also found
society’s most vulnerable groups.”
that while the probability of further misconduct by State Farm was
high, the probability of its having to pay damages for that miscon146
duct was low, a finding which further supported a high ratio.
Finally, the Utah court applied BMW’s third guidepost and
compared the punitive damages award with the civil and criminal
147
penalties that could be imposed for comparable misconduct. The
court rejected State Farm’s argument that only fines actually imposed could be used in the comparison, observing that BMW explicitly stated that a court should look at “penalties that could be
148
In reaching its decision,
imposed for comparable misconduct.”
the Utah court tallied the possible penalties that could have been
imposed for the fraudulent misconduct in the case, which included
fines, revocation of State Farm’s state business license, disgorge-

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
Id. at 1152.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 580 (1996)).
Id. at 1154.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting BMW, 517 U.S. at 583) (emphasis added).
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ment of illicit profits, and imprisonment of State Farm’s officers for
149
up to five years.
It is worth noting that the Utah court’s decision did not directly address extraterritoriality—the extent to which the jury considered evidence of State Farm’s misconduct outside the state of
Utah—when it determined the punitive damages award. As previously discussed, in BMW, both the Alabama Supreme Court and
150
the United States Supreme Court considered this issue crucial.
The Utah Supreme Court did, however, consider two issues raised
by State Farm that may have related to evidence of out-of-state
conduct: the admissibility of evidence of “other acts” introduced to
show State Farm’s pattern of misconduct and the admissibility of
expert witness testimony introduced to show State Farm’s im151
While the Utah
proper and fraudulent company-wide policies.
court rejected State Farm’s arguments on these issues, it is surprising that the court did not consider, as part of its excessiveness inquiry, whether the “other acts” evidence and the expert witness
testimony included evidence of State Farm’s misconduct outside of
152
This consideration could have been improper for the jury
Utah.
to undertake when determining the punitive damages award under
BMW.
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court conducted its
own excessiveness review based on BMW’s guideposts and held
that the $145 million punitive damages award must be reduced,
153
stating that “this case is neither close nor difficult.” In analyzing
the case under BMW’s reprehensibility guidepost, the Court held
that a more modest punitive damages award would satisfy Utah’s
interests and that it was inappropriate to use the case “as a plat154
form to expose and punish” State Farm’s nationwide policies.
The Court then reiterated the proposition from BMW that a State
155
cannot punish a defendant for lawful out-of-state conduct. In addition, the Court observed that a state does not “have a legitimate
concern in imposing punitive damages to punish a defendant for
156
unlawful acts committed outside of the [s]tate’s jurisdiction.”

149.
150.
text.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id.
BMW, 517 U.S. at 567, 572-73; see supra notes 67-80 and accompanying
Campbell, 65 P.3d at 1155, 1159.
Id. at 1155-61.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1515 (2003).
Id. at 1516.
Id. at 1522.
Id. (emphasis added).
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The Court next rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the evidence of State Farm’s out-of-state lawful conduct was used solely
157
Punishment based upon
to show motive against the plaintiff.
consideration of conduct unrelated to that which harmed the plaintiff raises the specter of multiple punishments for the same harm—
158
something the Court sought to avoid. The Court stated that evidence of other bad acts “may be probative when it demonstrates
the deliberateness and culpability of the defendant’s action . . . but
that conduct must have a nexus to the specific harm suffered by the
159
plaintiff.” The Court then found that the jury in State Farm had
“awarded punitive damages to punish and deter conduct that bore
160
no relation to the [plaintiff’s] harm.” The Court continued:
A defendant’s dissimilar acts, independent from the acts upon
which liability was premised, may not serve as the basis for punitive damages. A defendant should be punished for the conduct
that harmed the plaintiff, not for being an unsavory individual or
business. Due process does not permit the courts, in the calculation of punitive damages, to adjudicate the merits of other parties’ hypothetical claims against a defendant under the guise of
the reprehensibility analysis, but we have no doubt the Utah Su161
preme Court did that here.

As for BMW’s ratio guidepost, the Court again declined to
impose a bright-line ratio rule, cautioning that the punitive damages award in any case “must be based upon the facts and circum162
stances of the defendant’s conduct and the harm to the plaintiff.”
However, the Court concluded that few awards “exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages . . . will
163
satisfy due process.” The Court stated: “Single-digit multipliers
are more likely to comport with due process, while still achieving
the State’s goals of deterrence and retribution, than awards with
164
The Court next observed that
ratios in the range of 500 to 1.”
while double-digit ratios may be appropriate where a highly reprehensible act results in small economic damages, the converse is also
true: “When compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser
ratio, perhaps only [1-to-1], can reach the outmost limit of the due
165
process guarantee.”
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
Id. at 1523.
Id. at 1522.
Id. at 1523.
Id.
Id. at 1524.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The Court additionally noted that the plaintiffs in State Farm
had received a substantial ($1 million) compensatory award to
166
compensate economic injury and emotional distress. The Court,
however, viewed the compensatory award in the case as having a
punitive element that was improperly duplicated in the punitive
167
The Court then rejected the Utah Supreme
damages award.
Court’s justifications for the large punitive damages award, which
included a low rate of detection and punishment for State Farm’s
168
bad conduct and enormous wealth.
Next, the Court analyzed the case under BMW’s comparable
sanctions guidepost, noting that the “most relevant civil sanction . . . appears to be a $10,000 fine for an act of fraud, . . . an
169
amount dwarfed by the $145 million punitive damages award.”
The Court rejected the Utah court’s speculation regarding the loss
of the business license, disgorgement of profits, and possible imprisonment since these possibilities were “drawn from evidence of
170
out-of-state and dissimilar conduct.” After completing its excessiveness analysis, the Court held that only “a punitive damages
award at or near the amount of compensatory damages” would be
171
justified.
The Exxon Valdez oil spill occurred in 1989—seven years before the Supreme Court carved out a substantive due process right
against “excessive” punitive damages awards in BMW. The
evolving due process excessiveness jurisprudence continues to af166. Id.
167. Id. at 1525.
168. Id. at 1526. The Court stated: “The wealth of a defendant cannot justify
an otherwise unconstitutional punitive damages award.” Id. at 1525.
169. Id. at 1526.
170. Id.
171. Id. Justice Scalia dissented, adhering to his view that “the Due Process
Clause provides no substantive protections against excessive or unreasonable
awards of punitive damages.” Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas also offered a dissent, reiterating his statement from Cooper that “the Constitution does
not constrain the size of punitive damages awards.” Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(quoting Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 443
(2001) (Thomas J., concurring)). Justice Ginsburg also dissented, expressing the
view that the Court’s opinion erodes deference to state decisions regarding the
scope of punitive damages they will allow. Id. at 1527-31 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg stated:
I remain of the view that this Court has no warrant to reform state law
governing awards of punitive damages. Even if I were prepared to accept the flexible guidelines prescribed in Gore, I would not join the
Court’s swift conversion of those guides into instructions that begin to
resemble marching orders.
Id. at 1531.
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fect the post-spill litigation immensely. In November of 2001, the
Ninth Circuit applied the BMW guideposts to In re Exxon Valdez
and concluded that the jury’s $5 billion punitive damages award
172
was excessive under the Due Process Clause. The Ninth Circuit
then remanded the case to the district court with an order to re173
duce the award. In December 2002, the district court, complying
174
with the Ninth Circuit’s order, reduced the award by $1 billion.
Exxon, unsatisfied with the reduction, filed an appeal. In August
2003, even before the parties submitted appellate briefs, the Ninth
Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case
so that the district court could reconsider its decision in light of
State Farm v. Campbell—the Supreme Court’s most recent due
175
process excessiveness decision. While In re Exxon Valdez commenced long before the Supreme Court’s decisions in BMW, Cooper, and State Farm, these cases will have a significant impact on
the final outcome of the litigation. In addition, In re Exxon Valdez
raises several issues regarding due process excessiveness review of
punitive damages awards that remain unresolved even after State
Farm. These issues will be discussed in Part V.
III. IN RE EXXON VALDEZ: THE BACKGROUND
A. The Spill and its Aftermath
The events surrounding the Exxon Valdez oil spill provide the
factual context upon which the Ninth Circuit and the district court
reached opposite conclusions regarding the constitutionality of the
punitive damages award. The Exxon Valdez departed the Alyeska
Pipeline Terminal at 9:12 p.m. on March 23, 1989, loaded with over
fifty-three million gallons of North Slope crude oil bound for a re176
finery in California. The vessel was a 987-foot-long single-hulled

172. Exxon II, F.3d 1215, 1241 (9th Cir. 2001).
173. Id.
174. Exxon III, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1068 (D. Alaska 2002).
175. Exxon IV, No. 03-35166, at 1 (9th Cir. Aug. 18, 2003) (Order). The Supreme Court decided State Farm in April, 2003.
176. Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, Oil Spill Facts: Details About the
Accident, at http://www.oilspill.state.ak.us/facts/details.html (last visited Oct. 1,
2003); see also John Keeble, The Imaginary Journey of Captain Joseph Hazelwood, in THE EXXON VALDEZ DISASTER: READINGS ON A MODERN SOCIAL
PROBLEM 23-33 (J. Steven Picou, et al., eds., 1997) (describing in detail the events
immediately preceding and following the grounding of the Exxon Valdez and describing contributing factors such as crew fatigue and understaffing).
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tanker and was the second-newest tanker in Exxon’s fleet.177 The
ship contained nineteen crew members and the captain, Joseph
178
Hazelwood. During the hours before the ship’s departure, Ha179
zelwood consumed at least fifteen ounces of alcohol. In fact, Hazelwood was an alcoholic who had undergone treatment but had
resumed drinking while in command of Exxon’s ships—facts that
180
were known to Exxon long before the spill.
After the ship exited the natural harbor, Hazelwood took control from a harbor pilot and began the regular procedures to maneuver the ship out of the normal shipping lanes in order to avoid
181
heavy ice calved from nearby glaciers. Hazelwood instructed the
first mate to return the vessel to the normal shipping lanes and left
182
However, the first mate failed to properly turn the
the bridge.
vessel and the ship “fetched up . . . hard aground . . . off Bligh
183
Hazelwood reported the grounding to the
Reef” at 12:04 a.m.
United States Coast Guard and attempted to move the vessel off
184
If he had been successful, the vessel might have capthe reef.
sized, risking the lives of the crew, and increasing the magnitude of
185
the spill.
The vessel was badly damaged and the grounding caused an
186
oil spill of massive proportions. Within the first few hours, over
187
Furthermore, the oil spill reten million gallons of oil spilled.
sponse plans proved woefully inadequate, and three days of calm
weather passed without much oil being skimmed from the sur188
face. A response barge maintained by Alyeska Pipeline Service
Company was out of service and unavailable for use, and there
177. Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, supra note 176; see also National
Response Team, The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: A Report to the President, May 1989
in THE EXXON VALDEZ DISASTER: READINGS ON A MODERN SOCIAL PROBLEM
39-50 (J. Steven Picou, et al., eds., 1997) (describing the design of the Exxon Valdez and the spill response plans that existed prior to the Exxon Valdez oil spill).
178. Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, supra note 176.
179. Exxon II, 270 F.3d 1215, 1223 (9th Cir. 2001).
180. Id.
181. Exxon III, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1045-46 (D. Alaska 2002).
182. Id. at 1046.
183. Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, supra note 176.
184. Exxon III, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 1046.
185. Id. at 1046-47.
186. Brian O’Donoghue, Diver’s First Glimpse: Supertanker Impaled On Rocks
of Bligh Reef, FAIRBANKS DAILY NEWS-MINER, Mar. 24, 1999, at A8 (“There was
a huge geyser of oil bubbling up two or three feet above the surface of the water.”)
187. National Response Team, supra note 177, at 39.
188. Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, supra note 2.
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were insufficient skimmers, booms, and dispersants to make a dif189
ference in so large a spill. The one bright spot in the response effort was the lightering operation—removing the remaining oil to
another ship—that was undertaken in spite of enormous risk to the
crew involved, but that ultimately kept forty-two million gallons of
190
oil from spilling. A storm hit on March 26, 1989, and strong
winds, coupled with ocean currents and tidal action, spread the oil,
washing it onto beaches as far as six-hundred miles from Bligh
191
Reef. The oil, in varying concentrations, eventually covered thir192
teen-thousand miles of the Alaskan coastline.
Commercial and subsistence fishing, recreational tourism, and
shore-based businesses were immediately disrupted as a result of
193
Coastal communities, fishermen, boat owners, and
the spill.
194
other property owners suffered extensive economic damages.
Individuals and communities also suffered grave non-economic
195
damages.
The spill is no longer one of the top fifty largest spills worldwide, but is considered to have had the greatest negative effect on
196
the environment. As a result of the spill, the natural resources in
197
the area were devastated. However, the question of the extent of
198
environmental damage and recovery remains a matter of dispute.

189. Id.
190. See Exxon III, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 1047; Brian O’Donoghue, Battle Waged
to Unload 991,000 Barrels of Crude, FAIRBANKS DAILY NEWS-MINER, Mar. 25,
1999, at A1.
191. O’Harrra, supra note 2, at M5.
192. Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, supra note 2.
193. Exxon III, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 1047.
194. Id.
195. See generally THE EXXON VALDEZ DISASTER: READINGS ON A MODERN
SOCIAL PROBLEM (J. Steven Picou, et al., eds., 1997) (collection of articles focusing on the spill as a systemic “technological disaster” and describing the ecological, economic, social, cultural, and psychological impacts); SHARON K. ARAJI, THE
EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL: SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACTS
ON HOMER (1992); see also Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, Home Page,
at http://www.oil.spill.state.ak.us (last visited Oct. 22, 2003) (providing a comprehensive collection of information related to all aspects of the spill, as well as a
large topical bibliography of scholarly articles and links to other sources of information).
196. Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, supra note 3 (“The timing of the
spill, the remote and spectacular location, the thousands of miles of rugged and
wild shoreline, and the abundance of wildlife in the region combined to make it an
environmental disaster well beyond the scope of other spills.”).
197. Nancy Lord, Oil in the Sea: Initial Biological Impacts of the Exxon Valdez
Oil Spill, in THE EXXON VALDEZ DISASTER: READINGS ON A MODERN SOCIAL
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Exxon soon began a cleanup operation that took place over
the next three summers and that employed over ten thousand
199
workers, one thousand boats, and one hundred aircraft. The op200
eration cost Exxon $2.1 billion. However, only a small percent201
age of the spilled oil—about 14%—was actually recovered.
Exxon also began a settlement program with the individuals and
entities who had suffered economic damages as a result of the spill,
and eventually paid out more than $300 million to over ten202
thousand claimants.
B. Exxon’s Settlement with the Government Trustees
Shortly after the spill, the federal government and the State of
Alaska filed suit against Exxon to recover for environmental damage caused by the spill. The parties ultimately settled the suit, and
Exxon agreed to pay a significant amount in fines and restitution,
plus an amount for the settlement itself. The Ninth Circuit, when it
concluded that the punitive damages award in In re Exxon Valdez
was excessive, pointed to this settlement agreement as a factor that
203
should mitigate the size of the punitive damages awarded. This
section summarizes the settlement agreement and its effect on subsequent private litigation.
The United States and the State of Alaska, acting as trustees
for the public, filed suit against Exxon pursuant to provisions of the
204
Clean Water Act and the Comprehensive Environmental Re-

PROBLEM 104 (J. Steven Picou, et al., eds., 1997) (stating that over 260,000 birds,
and 3,500 sea otters died as a result of the spill).
198. Doug O’Harra, Exxon Valdez: Legacy of a Spill: Sound Battles Back, But
Threats Linger, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Mar. 21, 1999, at M1 (stating: “Over
the years since the March 24, 1989, spill, Prince William Sound has become a
demonstration of the resilience of nature and the persistence of North Slope
crude.”). There are also several ten-year retrospective newspaper accounts covering the ecological and other impacts of the spill. See also Glen Martin, Valdez
Spill Leaves Bitter Residue; Oil is gone after 10 years, but ecological, economic fallout continues, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 24, 1999, at A1; Ross Anderson, The Spill Is
Gone—10 Years Later, Debate Still Rages over Effects of the Exxon Valdez Disaster In Alaska, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 21, 1999, at A14.
199. Martin, supra note 198, at A1.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Exxon II, 270 F.3d 1215, 1223 (9th Cir. 2001); Jenkins & Kastner, supra
note 5, at 155.
203. Exxon II, 270 F.3d at 1244.
204. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1386 (2000).
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sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act205 in order to “recover
damages for restoration of the environment as well as for losses
206
sustained by the public regarding the use of natural resources.”
The United States also criminally prosecuted Exxon for violating
several environmental statutes, including provisions of the Clean
Water Act, the Refuse Act, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, the
207
Ports and Waterways Safety Act, and the Dangerous Cargo Act.
As part of the subsequent settlement agreement, Exxon pled
guilty to four misdemeanor counts, was fined $25 million, and was
208
Exxon also
ordered to pay $100 million in criminal restitution.
agreed to pay $900 million into a trust fund administered by agen209
cies of the United States and the State of Alaska. The district
court approved the parties’ consent decree in October 1991, stating
that the recovery was “compensatory and remedial” and that
“[n]othing in this agreement . . . is intended to affect legally the
claims, if any, of any person or entity not a Party to this Agree210
ment.”
Since the government trustees had acted on behalf of the public to recover the damages to the environment, no future plaintiff
could thereafter recover damages for environmental harms. In
211
Alaska Sport Fishing Association v. Exxon Corporation, a group
representing sport fishing enthusiasts filed a class action suit argu-

205. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000) (hereinafter “CERCLA”).
206. Jenkins & Kastner, supra note 5, at 181.
207. Exxon III, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1048 (D. Alaska 2002).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1047; see also United States v. Exxon Corp., No. A91-082 at 3 (D.
Alaska 1991) (consent decree); State of Alaska v. Exxon Corp., No. A91-083 Civil,
at 3 (D. Alaska 1991) (consent decree). The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee
Council, consisting of three state and three federal agency representatives was
formed to use the settlement funds to restore the injured ecosystem. See Exxon
Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, Oil Spill Facts: Settlement, at http://www.
oilspill.state.ak.us/gem/facts/settlement.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2003); see also
Diane S. Calendine, Investigating The Exxon Valdez Restoration Effort: Is
Resource Acquisition Really Restoration?, 9 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 341, 343
(2000) (criticizing the use of the settlement trust funds to purchase equivalent
lands instead of attempting to return the damaged lands to pre-spill conditions);
Kevin R. Murray, et. al., Natural Resource Damage Trustees: Whose Side Are They
Really On?, 5 ENVTL. LAW. 407, 407 (1999) (describing the federal statutes which
appoint governmental entities to act as trustees to oversee the process of repairing
damaged natural resources and offering pointed criticism of those systems).
210. United States v. Exxon Corp., No. A91-082, at 3, 26 (D. Alaska Oct. 9,
1991) (consent decree).
211. 34 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 1994).
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ing that they suffered an injury distinct from that suffered by the
general public—lost recreational use of public natural resources
212
The Ninth Circuit found that the two govdue to the oil spill.
ernments in the previous settlement agreement had acted as public
213
Therefore,
trustees with authority to recover lost-use damages.
the court concluded that privity of interest existed between the
trustees and the sport fishers and that sufficient identity of the issues existed to bar the sport fishers’ suit under the doctrine of res
214
judicata. Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit distinguished the In re
Exxon Valdez plaintiffs, who sought to recover economic damages
due to commercial fishing losses, from the Alaska Sport Fishing
215
plaintiffs.
IV. IN RE EXXON VALDEZ: THE CASE
This section summarizes the In re Exxon Valdez litigation as it
pertains to the due process excessiveness challenge raised by
Exxon and is divided into several sub-sections: Section A discusses
the case before the district court; Section B discusses the arguments
made by Exxon regarding its due process excessiveness challenge;
Section C discusses the plaintiffs’ response to those arguments;
Section D summarizes the Ninth Circuit’s decision to vacate the
punitive damages award and remand; Section E summarizes the
parties’ arguments to the district court upon remand; and Section F
summarizes the district court’s conclusion that the punitive damages award was not constitutionally excessive.
A. The Case Before the District Court
The thirty thousand claims brought by private parties seeking
to recover economic damages slowly filtered through the judicial
funnel of the Alaska state court system and then, after removal,
216
Through various mothrough the federal district court system.
212. Id. at 770-71; see also Scott Kerin, Alaska Sport Fishing Association v.
Exxon Corporation Highlights the Need to Take a Hard Look at the Doctrine of
Parens Patriae When Applied to Natural Resource Damage Litigation, 25 ENVTL.
L. 897, 923 (1995) (describing the suit brought by sport fishing enthusiasts and offering a critical analysis of the Ninth Circuit’s “blind allegiance to the sufficiency
of government parens patriae action” to the detriment of private litigants).
213. Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n, 34 F.3d at 772.
214. Id. at 774.
215. Exxon II, 270 F.3d 1215, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 2001); see also infra notes 325329 and accompanying text.
216. Jenkins & Kastner, supra note 5, at 166-78 (providing a detailed summary
of the complicated litigation following the spill); see also David Lebedoff,
CLEANING UP: THE STORY BEHIND THE BIGGEST LEGAL BONANZA OF OUR TIME
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tions filed by Exxon, the plaintiffs were gradually whittled down.217
Most of the remaining claims were consolidated into one class action—In re Exxon Valdez—with three certified classes for compensatory damages: (1) a commercial fishing class; (2) a Native class;
218
and (3) a landowner class. Exxon did not dispute its liability for
compensatory damages, stipulating that its negligence had caused
219
the oil spill. Only the amount of the compensatory damages and
220
In addiExxon’s liability for punitive damages were disputed.
tion, the district court certified a mandatory punitive damages
class, “so the award would not be duplicated in other litigation and
would include all punitive damages the jury thought appropri221
ate.”
The trial began on May 2, 1994, and was divided into three
222
phases. In the first phase, the jury found that Exxon had been
223
reckless, which made it liable for punitive damages. In the second phase, the jury found that Exxon was liable to the commercial
224
fishermen for $287 million in compensatory economic damages.
In the third phase, the jury was charged with deciding the appropriate amount of a punitive damages award, if any, against
225
Exxon. Regarding the jury verdict on punitive damages, the district court stated, “In consultation with counsel, unusually detailed
punitive damages instructions were developed for the purposes of
226
this case.” The jury returned a punitive damages award of $5 bil227
Exxon filed a motion for reduction or remittitur of the
lion.
award, but it was denied by the district court, which entered a final
228
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on September 24, 1996. Exxon

1 (1997) (providing an interesting literary account of the people involved in the oil
spill and subsequent civil litigation).
217. Jenkins & Kastner, supra note 5, at 168.
218. Exxon II, 270 F.3d at 1225; Exxon III, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1048 (D.
Alaska 2002).
219. Exxon III, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 1048.
220. Id.
221. Exxon II, 270 F.3d at 1225.
222. Exxon III, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 1048.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Exxon II, 270 F.3d at 1225. A fourth phase, to determine the compensatory damages of the plaintiffs other than the commercial fishermen was planned,
but these claims settled before trial. Id.
226. Exxon III, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 1049.
227. Id. at 1068.
228. Id. at 1050 n.24.
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subsequently appealed and obtained a stay of execution by posting
229
a supersedeas bond in the amount of $6.75 billion.
B. Exxon’s Due Process Challenge to the Punitive Damages
Award
On appeal, Exxon raised several issues, including a due process challenge to the $5 billion punitive damages award.230 Specifically, Exxon argued that when analyzed under the BMW guideposts, the jury’s award exceeded the constitutional limit of the Due
231
Process Clause and “must be drastically reduced.” Considering
the degree of reprehensibility guidepost first, Exxon argued that it
229. Id. at 1050. A supersedeas bond is required when a party petitions to set
aside a judgment or to stay execution during an appeal from which the other party
may be made whole if the action is unsuccessful. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1438
(6th ed. 1990); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(d).
230. Joint Opening Brief of Appellants Exxon Corp. and Exxon Shipping Co.
at 71-76, Exxon II, 270 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2001) (No. 97-351191). In its Opening
Brief—which was over one-hundred pages long—Exxon raised the following additional nine main arguments: (1) Exxon argued that any award of punitive damages
was impermissible under the Due Process Clause because sufficient punishment
and deterrence had already been obtained through the $900-million settlement
with government trustees, the $304 million in compensation to private parties, the
$125 million in criminal penalties, and the $2.1 million clean-up expenditure, id. at
27; (2) Exxon argued that under federal maritime law punitive damages are not
available when other liabilities and costs provide effective deterrence and punishment, id. at 32; (3) Exxon argued that the $900 million settlement with the State
of Alaska—which acted in a parens patriae capacity—included all public punitive
damages claims and therefore barred future plaintiffs from seeking punitive damages under the principle of res judicata, id. at 34-40; (4) Exxon argued that availability of the common law punitive damages remedy was preempted by the Clean
Water Act’s remedial scheme in which Congress had explicitly provided remedies
to punish and deter oil spills but had deliberately chosen not to provide punitive
damages even for “willful misconduct,” id. 40-41; (5) Exxon argued that the district court erred when it instructed the jury that the burden of proof to be used to
determine whether punitive damages were warranted was the preponderance of
the evidence standard and not the heightened clear and convincing evidence standard, id. at 43-47; (6) Exxon argued that under federal maritime law it should not
have been held vicariously liable for Hazelwood’s recklessness, because Hazelwood violated its explicit policies and instructions, id. at 48-52; (7) Exxon argued
that the jury’s punitive damages award could not be supported due to insufficient
evidence that Hazelwood recklessly caused the grounding or that Exxon recklessly
disregarded the risk of an accident, id. at 56-62; (8) Exxon argued that the jury
improperly considered evidence from outside the record, id. at 85; and (9) Exxon
argued that the jury incorrectly calculated the compensatory damages award, id. at
88.
231. Id. at 71.
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had been improperly punished for Hazelwood’s unauthorized acts,
232
which were contrary to company policies. Exxon contended that
any negligence on its part in hiring and supervising Hazelwood fell
short of the recklessness needed to justify a large punitive damages
233
award. Exxon also argued that the award was unwarranted because its conduct was unintentional, unlike the examples of reprehensible conduct identified by the Supreme Court, such as vio234
lence, deceit, or intentional malice. Exxon stated, “[n]either the
grounding of the Exxon Valdez nor the oil spill resulted in plaintiffs’ death or personal injury, or put their ‘health and safety’ at
235
risk.”
Exxon also contended that the reprehensibility of its conduct
was fully mitigated by its extensive post-spill “efforts to clean up
236
the oil and mitigate any harm from it, at a cost of over $2 billion”
Exxon also took issue with the plaintiffs’ argument that the oil spill
237
was reprehensible because it caused great environmental harm.
Exxon pointed out that the district court had instructed the jury not
to consider damage to natural resources or to the environment
238
generally. To that end, Exxon emphasized the following portion
of the district court’s jury instruction: “Any liability for punitive
damages relating to these harms has been fully resolved in proceedings involving the Exxon defendants and the Natural Resource
239
Trustees. . . .”
Next, Exxon turned to BMW’s second guidepost—the ratio of
the punitive damages award to the actual harm to the plaintiff.
Exxon noted that the district court had calculated the total harm to
the plaintiffs as somewhere between $288 and $418 million, which
resulted in a punitive to compensatory ratio of somewhere between
240
twelve to one and seventeen to one. Exxon stated, “If 4-to-1 was

232. Id. at 72.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 71-72 (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 599
(1996)).
235. Id. at 73 (quoting BMW, 517 U.S. at 599).
236. Id.
237. Joint Reply Brief and Joint Answering Brief of Exxon Corp. and Exxon
Shipping Co. at 44, Exxon II, 270 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2001) (No. 97-351191). Like
its Opening Brief, Exxon’s Reply Brief was over one-hundred pages long.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Joint Opening Brief of Appellants Exxon Corp. and Exxon Shipping Co.
at 74-75, Exxon II, 270 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2001) (No. 97-351191). Exxon also contended that the district court had improperly included the voluntary payments
Exxon had made to some plaintiffs in its total and that the true amount of the
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‘close to the line’ in Haslip—a case of intentional fraud which was
purposely concealed—then in this case, with easy-to-detect harm,
substantial compensatory damages, and an unparalleled record of
remedial and corrective measures costing more than $3 billion, a 4241
to-1 ratio would be far over the line.”
Regarding BMW’s third guidepost—comparison of the sanctions imposed for similar conduct—Exxon argued that the punitive
damages award was excessive since it had already paid the criminal
sanction imposed against it by the district court. Exxon argued that
federal and state officials, acting pursuant to the Clean Water Act,
had found that a fine of $25 million (remitted from $150 million)
and restitution of $100 million “was sufficient to accomplish punishment and deterrence in light of Exxon’s $3.5-billion expenditures for clean up, natural resource damages, and claims pay242
Exxon noted that the punitive damages award was
ments.”
twenty times the amount of the criminal fine and argued that since
BMW advised reviewing courts to give “substantial deference” to
comparable sanctions, the punitive damages award against it “must
243
be set aside or drastically reduced.”
Exxon contended that the plaintiff’s analysis of the compara244
Specifically, Exxon argued
ble sanction guidepost was flawed.

harm was only $222 million, a figure which would result in a twenty-three to one
ratio. Id. at 75.
241. Id. at 76. Exxon also criticized the plaintiff’s analysis of BMW’s ratio
guidepost, arguing that the high-ratio cases the plaintiffs cited involved a combination of intentional torts, low compensatory damages, and low detection rates,
which necessitate larger punitive damages to provide deterrence. Joint Reply
Brief and Joint Answering Brief of Exxon Corp. and Exxon Shipping Co. at 45,
Exxon II (No. 97-351191). Exxon stated that: “None of the plaintiff’s cases involved a non-intentional tort for which (1) criminal punishment had previously
been assessed; (2) compensatory damages were in the multimillions; and (3) the
tortfeasor’s accident-related losses and expenses were in the multibillions.” Id. at
46. Exxon also provided a lengthy critique of the manner in which the plaintiffs
calculated the amount of their harm. Id. at 46-50. Exxon contended that the
plaintiffs should not have included the following items in their calculation of harm:
(1) the $98 million settlement payment from Alyeska; (2) the $123 million Exxon
voluntarily paid to fish processors; (3) the $339 million that the plaintiffs claimed
in the impact stipulation; (4) the amount of potential harm that could have resulted if more oil had spilled; and (5) the claims made by the plaintiffs which were
not legally cognizable. Id.
242. Joint Opening Brief Of Appellants Exxon Corp. and Exxon Shipping Co.
at 76, Exxon II (No. 97-351191).
243. Id. at 77.
244. Joint Reply Brief and Joint Answering Brief of Exxon Corp. and Exxon
Shipping Co. at 50, Exxon II (No. 97-351191).
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that the plaintiffs’ estimate of the potential criminal penalty of $8
billion had a “fairy-tale quality . . . in a world where the $125 million in fines and restitution actually imposed exceeded the total of
245
all previous environmental fines . . . .” Exxon argued that under
BMW, the consideration “is not the hypothetical fine that could
246
have been imposed, but the fine that actually was imposed.” Furthermore, Exxon contended it did not have fair notice of such a
247
huge penalty—the basis for BMW.
In addition to providing an analysis of the BMW guideposts,
Exxon also took issue with what it characterized as the “[p]laintiff’s
248
wealth argument.” Exxon argued that just because it can afford
to pay the punitive damages award, it does not make it reason249
able. Exxon stated that the BMW court sent a clear message that
the wealth of the defendant is not a valid basis for affirming a large
250
punitive damages award. Exxon contended that the costs of the
oil spill had already sufficiently deterred the company and stated
that, “[t]here is simply no rational basis to conclude on the basis of
Exxon’s size or wealth that piling on an additional $5 billion was or
251
is necessary to induce Exxon to change its behavior.”
C. The Plaintiffs’ Arguments Regarding Exxon’s Due Process
Challenge to the Punitive Damages Award
The Plaintiffs’ Brief included a lengthy discussion of the due
252
process challenge to the punitive damages award. The plaintiffs
245. Id. at 51 (emphasis in the original).
246. Id. (emphasis in the original).
247. Id. at 51-52.
248. Id. at 52.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 52-53.
251. Id. at 56.
252. Brief of the Plaintiffs at 116-49, Exxon II, 270 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2001)
(Nos. 97-351191, 97-35193). In its 247-page brief, the plaintiffs made the following
arguments: (1) that the district court gave Exxon extraordinary procedural and
substantive protections, id. at 59-65; (2) that Exxon cannot claim immunity from
punitive damages as a matter of law due to the costs, sanctions, and settlements
arising from the spill, id. at 65-84; (3) that the Clean Water Act does not preempt
punitive damages awards, id. at 78-84; (4) that the district court correctly instructed the jury that the burden of proof required to prove Exxon’s recklessness
was the preponderance of the evidence standard, id. at 85-87; (5) that Exxon could
be held responsible for the reckless actions of a managerial agent, id. at 95-106; (6)
that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s findings that the spill was
caused by recklessness, id. at 106-16; (7) that the $5-billion punitive damages
award was proper, id. at 116-49; (8) that the district court properly rejected
Exxon’s allegation that the jury had considered outside material, id. at 150-53; and
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began by discussing the standard of review that should be applied
when a court examines the due process fair notice excessiveness
253
inquiry of a lower court. Since the Plaintiff’s Opening Brief predated Cooper’s holding that a de novo standard must be applied,
the plaintiffs stated that only the abuse-of-discretion standard
254
Similarly, the plaintiffs argued that the district
should be used.
court itself was obliged to give “substantial deference” to the jury’s
255
discretion to award punitive damages. Pointing out that the district court had “conducted a thorough review of the jury’s determination [based on] the relevant factors,” the plaintiffs argued that
the district court had not abused its discretion when it concluded
that a reasonable jury could have determined that the punitive
damages award was required to punish and deter Exxon and that
256
the award was not contrary to the great weight of the evidence.
Based on these contentions, the plaintiffs argued that “review
of the punitive damage factors that have been identified by the Supreme Court and this Court” would show that “the district court
257
was well within its discretion.” The plaintiffs offered the following factors to the Ninth Circuit for its review: (1) the reprehensibility of Exxon’s conduct; (2) the vulnerability of the plaintiffs; (3) the
actual and potential harm caused by Exxon’s conduct; (4) a comparison of the potential criminal and civil penalties; (5) Exxon’s fi258
nancial condition; and (6) Exxon’s lack of contrition.
The plaintiffs sought to provide the evidentiary basis upon
which the jury could have found that Exxon’s conduct was reprehensible. First, the plaintiffs pointed to Exxon’s stipulation that it
knew that an oil spill in Prince William Sound would have a signifi(9) that the jury’s calculation of the compensatory damages award was based on
substantial evidence and should not be disturbed, id. at 154-60.
253. Id. at 116.
254. Id. at 116-19.
255. Id. at 119. To support its contentions, the plaintiffs quoted the following
portion of the Supreme Court’s decision in Browning-Ferris v. Kelco Disposal,
Inc.:
In reviewing an award of punitive damages, the role of the district
court is to determine whether the jury’s verdict is within the confines set by law, and to determine . . . whether a new trial or remittitur should be ordered. The Court of Appeals should then review
the district court’s determination under an abuse-of-discretion
standard.
Id. at 117 (quoting Browning-Ferris v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 279
(1989)).
256. Id. at 119 (citation omitted).
257. Id. at 120.
258. Id. at 121-42.
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cant impact on the environment.259 Second, the plaintiffs contended that Exxon knew that assigning an alcoholic master to a
260
Third, the
tanker would increase the likelihood of such a spill.
plaintiffs contended that Exxon knew that Hazelwood was an alco261
holic who was likely to suffer a relapse. Under BMW’s reprehensibility guidepost, the plaintiffs concluded that Exxon’s knowing
disregard of these risks was an “‘aggravating factor’ indicative of
262
‘particularly reprehensible conduct.’”
The plaintiffs then contended that the vulnerability of those
harmed was also an aggravating factor in assessing the degree of
263
Specifically, the
reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.
plaintiffs pointed to BMW for the proposition that “infliction of
economic injury . . . when the target is financially vulnerable, can
264
The plaintiffs contended that
warrant a substantial penalty.”
since commercial and subsistence fishing are inherently difficult
and risky endeavors dependent on natural resources, the plaintiffs
were particularly vulnerable to the risk of a major oil spill, but, un265
like Exxon, they had virtually no ability to avoid that risk.
Next, the plaintiffs made an argument based on BMW’s second guidepost—the ratio between the punitive damages award and
266
the harm caused by the defendant’s conduct. Unlike Exxon, the
plaintiffs characterized the ratio as between the punitive damages
award and “the ‘harm,’ not the net compensatory damage judg267
ment.” The plaintiffs argued the relevant estimate of harm to be
used in the ratio was the amount stipulated by the parties in Phase
III of the trial in the Impact Stipulation, and not, as Exxon argued,
268
Under the
the Phase II net compensatory damage judgment.
stipulation, the plaintiffs’ $768 million harm amount results in a ra269
tio of 6.5-to-1. Using Exxon’s $432 million harm amount results

259. Id. at 121 (citing the trial transcript).
260. Id.
261. Id. at 122. Plaintiffs also argued that Exxon knew of the risk of crew fatigue that resulted from operating its tankers with a reduced number of crew
members and of the risks of transporting oil through the sound at night and when
ice was present. Id. at 122-23 (citing the trial transcript).
262. Id. at 123 (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 599
(1996)).
263. Id. at 125.
264. Id. at 124 (quoting BMW, 517 U.S. at 599).
265. Id. at 125-26.
266. Id. at 126-34.
267. Id. at 127 (internal citations omitted).
268. Id.
269. Id. at 128-29.
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in a ratio of 11.6-to-1.270 The plaintiffs pointed out that: “[e]ither
ratio is well within the range of ratios upheld in recent punitive
271
damages cases.”
In addition, the plaintiffs contended that under BMW, “a
higher ratio . . . may be justified when the potential harm is greater
than the harm that actually occurred or when it is difficult to establish the existence or value of the harm, so that the compensatory
272
damages awarded do not reflect the total harm.” Using a “potential harm” argument to justify the large punitive damages to harm
ratio, the plaintiffs argued that if the tanker, the Exxon Valdez, had
spilled more than eleven million of the fifty million gallons of oil it
273
The
carried “the harm would have been many times greater.”
plaintiffs also argued that a higher ratio is justified because the
economic harm of an “oil spill is difficult to quantify and prove”
and because much of the harm caused by the spill remained un274
compensated.
Turning to BMW’s third guidepost—the comparison between
the punitive damages award and the sanctions imposed for similar
conduct—the plaintiffs contended that the relevant inquiry under
BMW is whether there is “‘fair notice’ to the tortfeasor of the po275
tential for punishment of the order of magnitude assessed.” Unlike Exxon, the plaintiffs characterized this guidepost as a comparison of the punitive damages award with “civil or criminal penalties
276
The plainthat could be imposed” for comparable misconduct.
tiffs pointed out that if Exxon had been convicted of violating the
five federal statutes under which it had been indicted, the district
court could have imposed a criminal penalty of “twice the gross
277
loss” pursuant to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The plain270. Id.
271. Id. at 129. The plaintiffs provide a long string cite of cases to support their
argument. Id. at 129 n.62.
272. Id. at 131 (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996)).
In actuality, the BMW Court stated that: “A higher ratio may . . . be justified in
cases in which the injury is hard to detect or the monetary value of noneconomic
harm might have been difficult to determine.” BMW, 517 U.S. at 582.
273. Brief of the Plaintiffs at 147, Exxon II (Nos. 97-351191, 97-35193) (internal
quotation omitted).
274. Id. at 131. Regarding uncompensated harm the plaintiffs stated that:
“Over 40,000 individuals and businesses who suffered hundreds of millions of
dollars of economic harm were barred by the [district court’s maritime law] dismissals.” Id. The plaintiffs also claimed that “vast emotional and psychological
harm” has gone uncompensated. Id. at 132-33.
275. Id. at 134.
276. Id. (emphasis added by plaintiffs) (quoting BMW, 517 U.S. at 584).
277. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (2001)).
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tiffs then argued that the gross loss amount included the $900 million trustee settlement, the $2.1 billion in cleanup costs, and all the
harm to the private plaintiffs—estimated at $432 million to $950
million—for a total loss of up to $4 billion, which would permit a
278
criminal penalty of up to $8 billion. Therefore, the plaintiffs argued, “Exxon certainly had notice that the applicable punishment
279
could exceed $5 billion.”
In addition to the BMW guideposts, the plaintiffs offered two
other factors that they contended have been used by courts when
“determining the amount of punitive damages necessary to punish
280
First, the plaintiffs argued that the financial condiand deter.”
tion of the defendant must be reflected in the punitive damages
award or else a wealthy defendant could be “impervious to the
281
The plaintiffs then demonsting of a punitive damage award.”
strated that “Exxon’s imperviousness to any punitive damage
award” by listing evidence offered at the trial to establish Exxon’s
wealth, including Exxon’s average annual revenue for the years
1989-1993 ($116.6 billion), Exxon’s market capitalization in 1993
($78.4 billion), and Exxon’s average net income for the years 1989282
1993 ($4.8 billion). Second, the plaintiffs argued that the degree
of remorse or contrition exhibited by a defendant is also a factor
283
used to determine the punishment. On this point, the plaintiffs
discussed Exxon’s post-spill conduct, attempting to show Exxon’s
284
alleged lack of contrition.
Finally, the plaintiffs argued that prior payments made by
Exxon as a result of the spill should not be viewed as a significant
285
mitigating factor. The plaintiffs argued that the criminal penalty
punished Exxon only for negligence, not recklessness, and that all
the other amounts paid would have been required even if Exxon
286
Furthermore, the plaintiffs conhad spilled the oil innocently.
tended that since the jury was not allowed to consider harm to the
environment when assessing the punitive damages, Exxon’s

278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

Id. at 135-36.
Id. at 136.
Id.
Id. at 137.
Id. at 138-39.
Id. at 142.
Id. at 143-45.
Id. at 146.
Id.
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cleanup expenditures should not be used to mitigate the punitive
287
damages award.
D. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision to Vacate the Punitive Damages
Award and Remand for Consideration under the BMW
Guideposts
In a decision filed on November 7, 2001, the Ninth Circuit held
that although an award of punitive damages was not barred, the $5
billion jury verdict was excessive and must be reduced by the dis288
trict court upon remand. While the court responded to each of
the main issues raised in the parties’ briefs, the grounds for vacating the award rested on Exxon’s due process challenge to the puni289
tive damages award.
1. The Ninth Circuit’s Due Process Fair Notice Excessiveness
Inquiry. The Ninth Circuit began by summarizing the Supreme
290
The
Court’s due process fair notice excessiveness jurisprudence.
court noted, “Two critical Supreme Court opinions, decided after
the district court’s decision in this case, have expanded the way
courts review constitutional challenges to large punitive damages
291
awards.” The court then described the fair notice excessiveness
guideposts established by BMW and the de novo review standard
292
established by Cooper.
Noting that the district court had not had the opportunity to
perform a fair notice excessiveness inquiry based upon the new criteria (since neither BMW nor Cooper had yet been decided), the
Ninth Circuit stated that it lacked a “constitutional analysis by the
293
The
district court over which to exercise any de novo review.”
court then remanded the issue stating, “[b]ecause we believe the
district court should, in the first instance, apply the appropriate
standards, we remand for the district court to consider the constitutionality of the amount of the award in light of the guideposts es294
tablished in BMW.” The Ninth Circuit, however, went on to pro287. Id. at 146-47. The plaintiffs made two additional arguments relating to the
punitive damages award: (1) that maritime law does not limit punitive damages,
id. at 147-48; and (2) that the manner in which the post-judgment interest was calculated reduced the impact of the punitive damages award on Exxon, id. at 149.
288. Exxon II, 270 F.3d 1215, 1242, 1246-47 (9th Cir. 2001).
289. Id. at 1241.
290. Id. at 1239-41.
291. Id. at 1239.
292. Id. at 1239-40; see also discussion supra Part II.D.
293. Exxon II, 270 F.3d at 1241.
294. Id.
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vide its own lengthy excessiveness analysis based upon BMW’s
295
guideposts, in order to “aid [the district court’s] consideration.”
The Ninth Circuit first analyzed the case under the degree of
reprehensibility guidepost. The court compared Exxon’s conduct
to that of the defendant in BMW, which the Supreme Court had
not found reprehensible enough to support the large punitive
296
judgment against it. The court noted that neither case involved
violence, nor “trickery or deceit,” and that in both cases the claims
297
were solely for injuries to private economic interests. The court
reiterated that the In re Exxon Valdez jury had been instructed to
exclude consideration of the environmental and natural resource
harm and focus only on the private economic harm when deter298
mining Exxon’s punitive damages liability.
The Ninth Circuit found that Exxon’s conduct was reprehensible because it was aware of the risks of transporting oil through
Prince William Sound and knew Hazelwood was a relapsed alco299
holic. The court stated, however, that “this goes more to justify
punitive damages than to justify punitive damages at so high a
300
level.” For the court, several factors reduced the reprehensibility
of Exxon’s conduct:
Exxon spent millions of dollars to compensate many people after
the oil spill, thereby mitigating the harm to them and the reprehensibility of its conduct. Reprehensibility should be discounted
if defendants act promptly and comprehensively to ameliorate
any harm they cause in order to encourage such socially beneficial behavior. Also, as bad as the oil spill was, Exxon did not
301
spill the oil on purpose, and did not kill anyone.

The Ninth Circuit then turned to BMW’s second guidepost—
the ratio of the punitive damages award to the actual harm to the
plaintiff, noting that the “reasonable relationship” ratio required
by BMW is “intrinsically somewhat indeterminate” because of the
difficulty in estimating the likely harm of the defendant’s con302
duct. The court then accepted the district court’s range estimate
295. Id. at 1241-46.
296. Id. at 1241-42; see discussion supra Part II.C.
297. Exxon II, 270 F.3d at 1241-42.
298. Id. at 1242.
299. Id.
300. Id. Although the court noted that Exxon had both direct liability for its
own acts and vicarious liability for Hazelwood’s acts, it stated that the comparison
of the $5000 punitive damages award against Hazelwood and the $5-billion punitive damages award against Exxon raised concerns “about the jury’s evaluation of
their relative reprehensibility.” Id.
301. Id. at 1242-43.
302. Id. at 1243.
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of the total harm as $287 million to $418 million, and stated that it
“produces a ratio [to the $5 billion punitive damages award] between 12-to-1 and 17-to-1. This ratio greatly exceeds the 4-to-1 ra303
tio that the Supreme Court called ‘close to the line’ in [Haslip].”
The Ninth Circuit stated that the voluntary payments made by
Exxon should not be used as part of the harm estimate for purposes of calculating the ratio “because that would deter settlements
304
Similarly, the court reasoned that Exxon’s
prior to judgment.”
cleanup expenditures, casualty losses, fines, settlements, and compensatory damages “should be considered part of the deterrent al305
ready imposed” for the spill. After tabulating Exxon’s costs attributable to the spill at $3.4 billion, the court stated:
A company hauling a cargo worth around $25.7 million has a
large incentive to avoid a $3.4 billion expense for the trip. . . .
Just the expense, without any punishment, is too large for a prudent transporter to take much of a chance, given the low cost of
306
making sure alcoholics do not command their oil tankers.

For the court, BMW’s ratio guidepost helps avoid the overdeterrence that can result from excessive punitive damages

303. Id. (quoting Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 (1991)).
304. Id. at 1244.
305. Id. One can query why the cleanup costs should be considered as part of
the deterrent and excluded as part of the harm. As the Ninth Circuit reminded,
the case was not about “befouling the environment,” yet only because the environment was befouled did Exxon have to spend so much to clean it up. If the jury
was not allowed to consider harm to the environment when determining the punitive damages, why should the expenses of mitigating harm to the environment be
deducted as deterrent already imposed and used as a justification to reduce the
jury’s award?
306. Id. The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning is dubious. First, the court assumes that
the only risk to be avoided when transporting oil on tankers is that posed by alcoholic masters. In reality, the risks (and costs of avoiding those risks) are much
more prevelant. Due to the toxic nature of crude oil, transporting it at all entails
risk. Certainly, transporting at night, when ice is present in the shipping lanes,
with a tanker that lacked a double-hull, and with a skeleton crew, all increased the
risk that the Exxon Valdez would spill oil into Prince William Sound. Hazelwood’s alcoholism was only the most direct cause of the spill on that particular
trip. Second, the court fails to realize that it isn’t only the expense of an accident
that gives a corporation an incentive to take measures to avoid the accident, but
rather the likelihood of such an accident. If the likelihood of a major oil spill is
low—say one spill per every five thousand trips—and the transporter determines
that it would cost more to implement all of the preventive measures than to cover
the costs of a spill, the transporter may choose to simply risk it. This is especially
true if much of the harm of an oil spill remains externalized.
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awards.307 The court concluded that a “lesser amount” than the $5
billion punitive damages award would be enough to deter future
308
bad acts by Exxon.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit examined the case under BMW’s
309
“comparable sanctions” guidepost. The court explained that the
purpose of the guidepost is to accord “substantial deference” to
legislative judgments regarding the civil or criminal penalties “that
310
could be imposed for comparable misconduct.” Since there were
legislative statutes regarding the conduct at issue and because actual penalties had been imposed on Exxon as a result of the spill,
311
the court found the case to be “unusually rich in comparables.”
The court stated that Exxon’s criminal liability for a misdemeanor under the appropriate federal statute would be a fine of
$200,000, or as the plaintiffs argued, a fine of double the gross loss
resulting from the offense—which, under the district court’s highest
312
estimate of damages would result in a fine of about $1 billion.
The court also examined the civil liabilities provided under the
313
federal Trans-Alaska Pipeline Act. The court noted that under
the Act, the maximum sanction for which a vessel owner or operator could be held strictly liable for discharging oil was $100 mil314
lion—“only 1/50 of the punitive damages award.” The court next
considered the $150 million plea agreement that Exxon entered
into with the United States, stating that it “represent[ed] an adversarial judgment by the executive officers of the state and federal
governments who had the public responsibility for seeking the ap-

307. Id. The Ninth Circuit appeared to favor the view that punitive damages
awards should be imposed to achieve economically optimal deterrence. However,
this “economic efficiency” theory was discredited by the Supreme Court’s decision
in Cooper, which stated that deterrence is only one of the objectives of punitive
damages, and that juries might properly value the punishment of immoral behavior above economic efficiency. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group,
Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 439 (2001). For an explanation of the economically optimal deterrence theory by its principal academic proponents, see Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 91, at 877.
308. Exxon II, 270 F.3d at 1244.
309. Id. at 1245.
310. Id. (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996)).
311. Id.
312. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3571(c)-(d) (2001)). The court rejected the plaintiff’s
notion that the $2.1 billion Exxon spent on the cleanup should be part of the loss
to be doubled, stating that it is damage to Exxon itself and not loss to another person as required by federal statute. Id.
313. Id. (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(1) (1986)).
314. Id. (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(3)).
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propriate level of punishment” and that it had been approved by
315
the district court as such.
The court completed its analysis of the comparable sanctions
guidepost by discussing the maximum permissible civil penalty under the federal Oil Pollution Act, which Congress passed as a result
of the Exxon Valdez oil spill to “assure that such spills would be
316
adequately deterred and punished in the future.” According to
the court, Exxon would have faced a civil penalty up to $3,000 for
each of the 261,905 barrels of oil it spilled resulting in a maximum
317
of $786 million. Each of the criminal and civil penalties the Ninth
Circuit compared are far less than the $5-billion punitive damages
award.
The Ninth Circuit concluded its due process fair notice excessiveness inquiry by stating that:
The $5 billion punitive damages award is too high to withstand
the review we are required to give it under BMW and Cooper
Industries. It must be reduced. Because these Supreme Court
decisions came down after the district court ruled, it could not
apply them. We therefore, vacate the award and remand so that
the district court can set a lower amount in light of the BMW and
318
Cooper Industries standards.

2. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision That Punitive Damages Were
Not Barred. While the due process fair notice excessiveness issue
led the Ninth Circuit to vacate the punitive damages award and
remand for reduction, five other issues warrant mention in this Article. Upon consideration of these issues, the court held that puni319
tive damages were not barred in the case. First, the court rejected
Exxon’s argument that punitive damages were barred under due
process because it had already been sufficiently punished and deterred by the criminal fines, civil sanctions, clean-up expenditures
320
and other costs. Second, the court rejected Exxon’s argument
that punitive damages are not allowed under maritime law, concluding that they generally are allowable under maritime law, and
321
thus were included in the present case.
Third, the Ninth Circuit rejected Exxon’s argument that punitive damages were barred by res judicata as a result of its settlement with the government trustees who acted as parens patriae for
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.

Id. at 1245-46.
Id. at 1246 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(7)(2001)).
Id.
Id. at 1246-47.
Id. at 1226.
Id. at 1225-26.
Id. at 1226-27.
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natural resource damage claims brought on behalf of the public
322
pursuant to the Clean Water Act. The court stated that the consent decree explicitly provided that “nothing in this agreement . . .
is intended to affect legally the claims, if any, of any person or en323
tity not a Party to this Agreement.” The court also noted that the
consent decree described the settlement as “compensatory and re324
medial,” rather than punitive.
Fourth, the court distinguished Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v.
325
Exxon Corp., upon which Exxon had relied for the proposition
that the consent decree had barred all future private claims for pu326
nitive damages. The Ninth Circuit explained that the sport fishing enthusiasts in that case were barred from claiming damages on
behalf of the public for lost use of natural resources because they
were in privity with the State, which had acted as parens patriae to
327
protect the natural resources. By contrast, the In re Exxon Valdez plaintiffs “sued to vindicate harm to their private land and their
328
ability to fish commercially and for subsistence.” The court held
that the private claims for punitive damages therefore remained
unaffected by the consent decree settling the public natural re329
source damage claims.
Fifth, the Ninth Circuit rejected Exxon’s contention that punitive damages were preempted by federal statute, concluding that
the Clean Water Act “does not preempt a private right of action
for punitive as well as compensatory damages for damage to pri330
vate rights.” Specifically, the court stated that:
[A] statute providing a comprehensive scheme of public remedies need not be read to preempt a preexisting common law private remedy . . . . The absence of any private right of action in
the Act for damage from oil pollution may more reasonably be

322. Id. at 1227-28.
323. Id. at 1227 (quoting the district court’s consent decree).
324. Id.
325. 34 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 1994).
326. Exxon II, 270 F.3d at 1227.
327. Id. at 1227-28.
328. Id. at 1228.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 1231. To support its holding, the Ninth Circuit stated that the Clean
Water Act “expressly provides that it does not preempt common law rights to
other relief,” and quoted the following section of the Act for support: “Nothing in
this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class of persons) may have
under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any effluent standard or
limitation or to seek any other relief.” Id. at 1230. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e)
(1990)) (emphasis added by the court).
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construed as leaving private claims alone than as implicitly de331
stroying them.

The court added, “What saves [the] plaintiff’s case from preemption is that the $5-billion award vindicates only private economic
and quasi-economic interests, not the public interest in punishing
332
harm to the environment.”
E. The Parties’ Arguments to the District Court Upon Remand
In memoranda to the district court, both parties reiterated
their respective positions on the due process fair notice excessive333
ness issue. The arguments, however, were sharply focused on the
Ninth Circuit’s application of the BMW factors and the extent to
334
which it was binding on the district court. Each party also sug335
gested new amounts for the punitive damages award.
1. Exxon’s Memorandum. Exxon argued that the Ninth Circuit’s due process excessiveness analysis was binding upon the dis336
trict court. Specifically, Exxon argued that the analysis was “not
in any sense dictum, since it is the rationale—the only explanation
the Ninth Circuit gave—for the Court’s holding that an award of $5

331. Id. at 1231.
332. Id.
333. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Renewed Motion of the Defendants Exxon Mobil Corp. and Exxon Shipping Co. for Reduction
or Remittitur of Punitive Damages Award, In re Exxon Valdez, 236 F. Supp. 2d
1043 (D. Alaska 2002) (No. A89-095); Plaintiffs’ Memorandum In Opposition to
Renewed Motion of Exxon Defendants For Reduction or Remittitur of Punitive
Damages Award, Exxon III, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1043 (D. Alaska 2002) (No. A89045).
334. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Renewed Motion of the Defendants Exxon Mobil Corp. and Exxon Shipping Co. For Reduction or Remittitur of Punitive Damages Award at 1-3, Exxon III (No. A89-095);
Plaintiffs’ Memorandum In Opposition to Renewed Motion of Exxon Defendants
for Reduction or Remittitur of Punitive Damages Award at 5-9, 13-22, Exxon III
(No. A89-045).
335. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Renewed Motion of
the Defendants Exxon Mobil Corp. and Exxon Shipping Co. For Reduction or
Remittitur of Punitive Damages Award at 24-25, Exxon III (No. A89-095); Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Renewed Motion of Exxon Defendants for
Reduction or Remittitur of Punitive Damages Award at 79, Exxon III (No. A89045).
336. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Renewed Motion of
the Defendants Exxon Mobil Corp. and Exxon Shipping Co. for Reduction or
Remittitur of Punitive Damages Award at 1, Exxon III (No. A89-095).
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billion was ‘too high.’”337 Exxon contended that, consistent with the
Ninth Circuit’s analysis, the district court was required to reduce
the punitive damages award to an amount between $25 million and
338
$40 million.
To justify such a radical decrease in the punitive damages
award, Exxon turned to the Ninth Circuit’s application of the
339
BMW guideposts. Exxon argued that while some punitive damages could be awarded against it for the tragic oil spill, its conduct
did not involve a sufficiently high degree of reprehensibility to war340
rant a substantial punitive damages award. Since the Ninth Circuit found none of the aggravating factors identified in BMW as indicative of particularly reprehensible conduct, Exxon argued that
341
only modest punitive damages were justified. Echoing the Ninth
Circuit, Exxon asserted that its post-spill actions mitigated the
harm to people and the environment and therefore reduced the
342
reprehensibility of its conduct. Exxon stated that the reprehensibility guidepost “militates in favor of a significant reduction from
the maximum amount of punitive damages that might otherwise be
343
allowable under the remaining BMW guideposts . . . .”
Next, Exxon argued that its “lack of reprehensibility” justified
only a two to one ratio of actual harm to punitive damages under
344
BMW’s ratio guidepost. Exxon contended that the Ninth Circuit
had held “that only compensatory damages awarded by judgment,
not settlements or other pre-judgment payments, count for pur337. Id. at 2-3. Exxon cited ten cases for the proposition that upon remand a
district court “has no choice about how to proceed. It ‘must implement both the
letter and the spirit of the mandate, taking into account the appellate court’s
opinion.’” Id. (quoting Vizcaino v. U.S. District Court, 173 F.3d 713, 719 (9th Cir.
1999).
338. Id. at 3.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 3-4 (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 580 (1996)).
However, in a footnote, Exxon expressed a contrary view:
[P]unitive damages were not properly awarded in this case, in any
amount. The Ninth Circuit having rejected these arguments, they are
foreclosed in this Court, and Exxon does not now make them. Nevertheless, this motion is without prejudice to Exxon’s position. Should a
further appeal become necessary, Exxon expressly reserves the right to
argue, in the Court of Appeals en banc and in the Supreme Court, that
the only permissible award of punitive damages in this case is zero,
and/or that a complete new trial of punitive damages is required.
Id. at 1 n.1.
341. Id. at 5-6.
342. Id. at 6-7.
343. Id. at 7.
344. Id. at 8-9.
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poses of the ratio calculus.”345 Exxon stated that the total amount
of compensatory judgments against it was $20.3 million, which, under the two to one ratio it advocated, would result in a punitive
346
For Exxon, the Ninth Circuit’s
damages award of $40 million.
“rule” limiting the ratio calculus to compensatory judgments would
minimize litigation because parties who had already been compensated would not clog the courts due to the “lure of punitive damages . . . nor press claims for vast sums in addition to what is neces347
sary to make them whole.”
To justify the two to one ratio, Exxon argued that since a four
to one ratio for intentional fraud was “close to the line” in Haslip,
the ratio chosen in a case involving unintentional acts should be
348
much lower. Since the “appropriate ratio depends primarily on
the need for deterrence,” and since the spill had already cost it over
$3.4 billion, Exxon contended that the conduct had already been
349
deterred and, therefore, a high ratio was not justified. Exxon further argued that when large compensatory damages are awarded—

345. Id. at 8. Exxon took great license in its interpretation of the following
Ninth Circuit statement: “The amount that a defendant voluntarily pays before
judgment should generally not be used as part of the numerator, because that
would deter settlements prior to judgment.” Exxon II, 270 F.3d 1215, 1244 (9th
Cir. 2001).
346. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Renewed Motion of the Defendants Exxon Mobil Corp. and Exxon Shipping Co. for Reduction
or Remittitur of Punitive Damages Award at 8-9, Exxon III, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1043
(D. Alaska 2002) (No. A89-095). Exxon did not attempt to reconcile its loose interpretation of the Ninth Circuit’s dicta with BMW’s explicit instruction that the
amount to be used in the ratio calculus is “the actual harm inflicted on the plaintiff.” BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 580 (1996).
347. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Renewed Motion of the Defendants Exxon Mobil Corp. and Exxon Shipping Co. for Reduction
or Remittitur of Punitive Damages Award at 11, Exxon III, (No. A89-095).
Exxon also argued that the prejudgment payments it made to commercial fishermen should not be viewed as compensation for harm, but rather as measures
taken which prevented harm from occurring. Id. at 12. For Exxon, this was due to
the fact that the payments were made before the fishing season, rather than after
it, when fishermen usually get paid for the season’s catch. Id. In this regard
Exxon stated that “the only difference in [a fisherman’s] economic position from
what it would have been had there been no spill, is that he received his money
sooner.” Id. at 13. Exxon also stated that the fishermen whom it employed during
the cleanup “had larger cash incomes than they would have earned if there had
been no spill,” a factor that it argued undermined the punitive damages award. Id.
348. Id. at 14.
349. Id. at 14-15.
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as in the verdict here—higher ratios for punitive damages are un350
warranted.
Next, Exxon argued that the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of the
comparable sanctions guidepost did not support the large punitive
351
damages award. Exxon reiterated that BMW required substantial deference to the legislative judgments regarding appropriate
sanctions and, since the Attorney General of the United States and
the state of Alaska had already imposed a punishment based upon
those judgments, an additional larger punishment for deterrence
352
Exxon eviwas neither necessary nor allowable under BMW.
denced that under the comparable sanctions guidepost, the punitive damages award could not exceed the $25 million fine that was
353
imposed as punishment.
Exxon then offered its suggestion for the reduced amount:
“Applying all guideposts together, it is plain that a constitutional
punitive damages award could not possibly be greater than $40
million. An award in a range between $25 million and $40 million
would fit the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of the law and facts, and
354
would reconcile the BMW guideposts.”
2. Plaintiff’s Memorandum. The plaintiffs argued that the
district court was not bound by the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of the
355
SpeBMW guideposts because they were not explicit holdings.
cifically, the plaintiffs argued that the Ninth Circuit’s use of the
BMW guideposts only bound the district court to reduce the punitive damages award and to conduct a due process fair notice exces356
siveness inquiry.
The plaintiffs further contended that the remainder of the
Ninth Circuit’s opinion was merely offered as an “‘analysis to aid
[in] th[e] consideration’ of the BMW guideposts,” and therefore
357
To support their argument, the plaintiffs
was not binding.
pointed to the prose and tenor of the Ninth Circuit’s decision, arguing that it was couched “in abstract, tentative language, consistent with [the] recognition that [the district court] is in a superior

350. Id. at 15-16.
351. Id. at 17-23.
352. Id. at 18-20.
353. Id. at 24.
354. Id.
355. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Renewed Motion of Exxon Defendants for Reduction or Remittitur of Punitive Damages Award at 6-9, Exxon
III (No. A89-045).
356. Id. at 5-6.
357. Id. at 6 (quoting Exxon II, 270 F.3d 1215, 1241 (9th Cir. 2001).
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position to apply the law to the facts ‘in the first instance.’”358 The
plaintiffs stated that the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of “some of the
relevant factors did not purport to preempt [the district court’s]
plenary consideration of the [issue]. . . . If [it] had regarded its discussion as dispositive, it would have set the constitutional limit it359
self rather than remanding.”
Next, the plaintiffs attempted to “aid” the district court by
360
providing their own lengthy due process inquiry. The Plaintiffs’
Memorandum reiterated previous points and raised new arguments
directed toward undermining the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that
the punitive damages award was excessive under BMW’s guide361
posts. First, the plaintiffs argued that Exxon had fair notice that
its reckless and highly reprehensible conduct would “subject it to
362
Specifically, the plaintiffs consubstantial punitive damages.”
tended that Exxon’s conduct was clearly reprehensible because it
knowingly left a relapsed alcoholic in command of a supertanker,
risking vast pollution and exposing the vulnerable plaintiffs to
363
broad economic and non-economic harm. The plaintiffs also contended that Exxon’s reprehensibility should not be discounted by
its pre-trial payments since they were not prompt, comprehensive,
364
or sincere.
The plaintiffs further argued that the $5 billion punitive damages award was fully consistent with BMW’s ratio guidepost because the amount of the award bore a reasonable relationship to
the harm resulting from Exxon’s conduct. On this point, the plaintiffs contended that the “harm” used in the ratio could properly include actual economic harm, non-economic harm, and the likely
365
harm that stemmed from Exxon’s reckless conduct. The plaintiffs
argued that the Ninth Circuit had properly refused to subtract
Exxon’s pretrial settlements when computing the actual harm, but
then took issue with the court’s statement that “[t]he cleanup expenses Exxon paid should be considered as part of the deterrent
366
already imposed.” Concluding its ratio analysis, the plaintiffs argued a high ratio was justified due to the circumstances of the case

358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.

Id. at 6 (quoting Exxon II, 270 F.3d at 1242).
Id. at 8.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 14-76.
Id. at 13-14.
Id. at 14-25.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 37-45.
Id. at 46-51 (quoting Exxon II, 270 F.3d 1215, 1244 (9th Cir. 2001)).
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and that ratios much higher than four to one are fully consistent
367
with Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent.
Next, the plaintiffs turned to the comparable sanctions guidepost, arguing that “[a] proper application of the law reveals that
Exxon had fair notice that it could be subject to criminal fines in
368
Specifically,
excess of the $5 billion punitive damages award.”
the plaintiffs argued that the Ninth Circuit had not suggested that
the criminal penalty actually imposed on Exxon was the only rele369
vant sanction to be considered. Rather, the plaintiffs contended
that the Ninth Circuit directed the district court to consider all the
370
The plaintiffs pointed out
“‘penalties that could be imposed.’”
that Exxon had fair notice that a major oil spill would expose it to
criminal and civil monetary sanctions far in excess of $5 billion
dollars and that Exxon executives, with “the responsibility and
authority to prevent acts that [could] cause a grounding,” could
371
have faced imprisonment for up to one year.
In addition, the plaintiffs also argued that when performing a
BMW review, a court must look at the defendant’s financial condi372
Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that Exxon’s financial
tion.
strength required a large punitive damages award in order to pro373
The plaintiffs arvide meaningful punishment and deterrence.
gued that Exxon’s financial resources had allowed it to delay the
litigation, impose great burdens on the plaintiffs, and profit from
the delay by earning a “handsome profit” on the money set aside to
374
pay the judgment.
Finally, the plaintiffs explicitly stated their suggestion regarding the reduced punitive damages award: “[The] plaintiffs recognize that the Ninth Circuit has directed [the district court] to reduce the punitive damages award, after analyzing the BMW
guideposts. Plaintiffs respectfully submit, however, that any reduction of the jury’s verdict below $4 billion cannot be justified under
375
Supreme Court precedent.”

367. Id. at 58.
368. Id. at 64.
369. Id.
370. Id. (quoting Exxon II, 270 F.3d at 1245 (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v.
Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996))).
371. Id. at 71-73 (citing 33 U.S.C. §§ 407, 411, 1319(c) (2000)).
372. Id. at 73.
373. Id. at 74.
374. Id. at 76-77.
375. Id. at 79.
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F. The District Court’s Decision to Reduce the Punitive Damages
Award by $1 Billion
On December 9, 2002, the district court issued an order
granting Exxon’s Motion for Reduction or Remittitur of the Punitive Damages Award and adopted the plaintiffs’ suggestion to re376
duce the award to $4 billion. While the court acknowledged that
pursuant to the Ninth Circuit’s remand order it had to reduce the
award, it nonetheless rejected the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that
377
the original award was excessive. Instead, the district court concluded that the “award was justified by the facts of the case and is
not grossly excessive so as to deprive Exxon of fair notice—its right
378
to due process.” The court stated:
[Since this] court’s independent evaluation of the BMW factors
as applied to the facts of this case have led it to the conclusion
that the $5 billion award was not grossly excessive, the court
does not perceive any principled means by which it can reduce
that award. . . . Since the $5 billion award must be reduced, the
court adopts the plaintiffs’ position as the means of resolving
conflict between its judgment and the directions of the court of
379
appeals.

Before the district court presented its due process excessiveness inquiry, it made several observations regarding BMW. First,
the court noted that while application of the reprehensibility and
comparable sanctions guideposts have been relatively consistent,
appellate courts have been “willing to find a wide variety of ratios
constitutionally acceptable”—providing lower courts with little
380
guidance. Second, the court observed that a major portion of the
Supreme Court’s decision in BMW focused on limiting Alabama’s
ability to punish and deter BMW to its legitimate in-state interests—a situation unlike the present case in which no attempt was
made to punish or deter Exxon for conduct unrelated to the oil
381
Third, the court observed that
spill in Prince William Sound.
376. Exxon III, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1068 (D. Alaska 2002).
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Id. at 1052 (citing numerous cases showing the wide disparity in ratios appellate courts have upheld); see also Swinton v. Potomac Corp., 270 F.3d 794, 81819 (9th Cir. 2001) (concluding that a twenty-eight to one ratio was acceptable);
United Int’l Holdings Inc. v. Wharf (Holdings) Ltd., 210 F.3d 1207, 1232-33 (10th
Cir. 2000) (finding that only a .87 to one ratio was acceptable when there was a
large compensatory award); Johanson v. Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 170 F.3d 1320,
1338-39 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that a one hundred to one ratio was acceptable).
381. Exxon III, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 1052-53 (“[T]he plaintiffs in making their
claims, this court in instructing the jury, and the jury in awarding punitive dam-
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BMW “was concerned that punitive damages were determined
382
The court
with reference to an inappropriate set of interests.”
noted that in the present case, proper and prescient jury instructions—unchallenged by the parties—were given, which mirrored
383
the guideposts subsequently embodied in BMW. This prevented
the jury from looking at other interests—such as environmental
384
The court
concerns—which were inappropriate considerations.
summarized its instructions to the jury as follows:
The jury was instructed on the purpose of punitive damages:
punishment and deterrence. The jury was admonished not to be
arbitrary: punitive damages must have a rational basis in the record and bear a reasonable relationship to harm done or likely to
result from the defendant’s conduct. The jury also was instructed on the subjects of reprehensible conduct and consideration of mitigation (as by voluntary payments) and some compari385
son to other available sanctions.

Finally, the district court observed that the situation was unlike
BMW, in which the defendant potentially faced “overdeterrence”
as a result of different plaintiffs seeking multiple punitive damages
386
awards based on the same conduct. Rather, in the present case,
the mandatory punitive damages class prevented Exxon from being
387
exposed to such multiple suits for punitive damages.
Turning to the BMW guideposts, the district court first dis388
The court found that while
cussed Exxon’s reprehensibility.
Exxon’s conduct was non-violent and unintentional, it nonetheless
was highly reprehensible since Exxon officials “deliberately permit[ed] a relapsed alcoholic to continue operating a vessel carrying
over 53 million gallons of volatile, toxic crude oil,” while knowing
the effects that a major oil spill would have on Prince William
389
Sound. The court concluded:
On the BMW hierarchy of reprehensibility, Exxon’s conduct,
while not reaching the top, falls just short. Its conduct was
criminal. Exxon’s decision to leave Captain Hazelwood in command of the Exxon Valdez demonstrated reckless disregard for
the livelihood, health, and safety of the residents of Prince Wil-

ages, were all focused upon the appropriate, relevant interests for which deterrence and punishment through punitive damages is permissible.”).
382. Id. at 1053.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 1054.
385. Id. at 1053.
386. Id. at 1054.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id. at 1055-56.
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liam Sound, the crew of the Exxon Valdez, and others. Exxon’s
390
conduct was highly reprehensible.

Next, the district court analyzed the ratio guidepost, noting
that under BMW, the compensatory side of the ratio included both
the “actual harm to the victim and the harm that was likely to occur”—something the jury in the present case had been instructed to
391
The district court concluded that the harm estimate
consider.
was not limited to the compensatory damage award, but also in392
cluded other recoveries. By its own calculations, the district court
393
found the total compensated harm to be $507 million.
The court then took issue with what it called “the most troubling aspect” of the Ninth Circuit’s decision: in applying BMW’s ratio analysis, the Ninth Circuit stated that a court should subtract
from the harm side the amount of voluntary payments made by a
394
The disdefendant, in order to encourage pretrial settlements.
trict court rejected this proposition, and found that the weight of
judicial authority supported the opposite conclusion—that payments made prior to judgment are included when calculating the
395
The district court found the Ninth Cirharm side of the ratio.
cuit’s reasoning illogical and stated that discounting voluntary
payments would reduce a defendant’s risk of going to trial, thereby
396
encouraging trials and deterring settlements.
The district court contended that deducting voluntary payments from the harm was not appropriate in the present case because the jury had been given specific instructions to guide it in de397
termining the appropriate amount of punitive damages.
Specifically, the court pointed out that the jury was instructed to
consider mitigating factors, such as payments the defendant made
398
The
to compensate victims and the cost of remedial measures.
court noted that it must presume the jury understood and followed
the instructions to the best of its ability, stating:
Presumably the jury already considered whether and to what extent punitive damages would be mitigated based on voluntary
payments by Exxon before judgment. Reducing actual harm . . .
unfairly skews the ratio in Exxon’s favor, and in effect gives
Exxon double credit for voluntary payments by reducing both
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.

Id. at 1057.
Id.
Id. at 1058-60.
Id. at 1060.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1061.
Id.
Id.
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punitive damages and actual harm for purposes of the . . . ratio
analysis. In this case, the court concludes that it should not
dis399
count actual harm by voluntary payments made by Exxon.

The district court next pointed out that there was additional
harm above the $507 million in compensated harm that should be
400
First, the
included in the total harm figure and ratio analysis.
court noted that Exxon’s recklessness caused more than mere economic harm to the 32,677 claimants, who were not merely “deceived about the quality of the paint on a new car[,]” but whose
401
lives were disrupted. The court noted that the oil spill caused social conflict, cultural disruption, and psychological stress in the af402
fected communities. Second, the court noted that some plaintiffs,
reinstated into the class action, had not yet had their damages de403
termined, but that significant harm was likely. Third, the court
noted that it is impossible to calculate the potential harm that might
404
have occurred if more oil had spilled. The court stated:
Because there is no way to quantify the non-economic, likely or
potential harms discussed above, the appropriate approach is to
proceed with the ratio calculation, but to accommodate the unknowns by allowing a higher ratio to pass muster . . . . In BMW,
the Court observed that “[a] higher ratio may . . . be justified in
cases in which the injury is hard to detect or the monetary value
of non-economic harm might have been difficult to deter405
mine.”

Even without considering additional harm, however, the district court noted that the $5 billion punitive damages award, along
with its $507 million compensated harm total, produces a harm-to406
Such a ratio follows both Supreme
punitive ratio of 9.85 to one.
407
Court and Ninth Circuit precedents.
Subsequently, the district court responded to the Ninth Circuit’s statement that BMW’s ratio analysis helps avoid overdeter408
rence. The Ninth Circuit’s suggestion that economically optimum
deterrence had already been achieved due to Exxon’s casualty
losses, cleanup expenses, fines, and settlement payments was re-

399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.

Id.
Id. at 1062-64.
Id. at 1062.
Id.
Id. at 1062-63.
Id.
Id. at 1063.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Exxon II, 270 F.3d 1215, 1244 (9th Cir. 2001).
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jected by the district court.409 It viewed the appellate court’s economic analysis as only “mak[ing] sense in the abstract or academic
world[,]” and that “what it theoretically takes to deter a rational
business person (cleanup costs, etc.), and what it takes to deter
410
corporate officials given to reckless conduct are very different.”
The district court also considered the way in which Exxon’s fi411
nancial strength should factor into the ratio analysis. The court
noted that while “punitive damages are intended to punish and de412
ter, they are not intended to be an economic death sentence.”
The court, however, concluded that given Exxon’s financial status,
the $5 billion award would not be a death sentence and was necessary to deter Exxon from further continued recklessness in its
413
transport of oil through Prince William Sound. In concluding its
ratio analysis, the court stated that a ten to one punitive damages
ratio was justified under the circumstances of the case and that the
$5 billion award did not excessively deter or excessively punish
414
Exxon.
Finally, the district court examined the case under BMW’s
comparable sanctions guidepost. The court noted that Exxon had
been charged with five counts of violating federal criminal statutes,
had pled guilty to three counts, and had paid a $25 million fine and
415
$100 million in restitution. The court stated, however, that since
due process “fair notice” is the focus of the comparable sanctions
analysis, the potential sanctions are the proper criteria to con416
sider. In this regard, the court noted that under each of the five
federal criminal offenses, Exxon might have been fined “twice the
gross [pecuniary] loss” occasioned by the spill, resulting in fines
that could have exceeded the “jury’s punitive damages award in
417
this civil case.” The court also noted that federal law provides for
imprisonment—”a recognized legislative signal of heightened seri418
The court concluded its comparable
ousness of the offense.”
sanctions analysis by stating, “the court is well satisfied that Exxon
was quite fairly on notice that its officers could face imprisonment
and the company could face in excess of $5 billion in criminal and
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.

Id. at 1064.
Id.
Id. at 1064-65.
Id. at 1065.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1066.
Id.
Id. at 1066-67 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (2000)).
Id. at 1067 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3551).

111103 CHAMBERS.DOC

250

12/29/03 2:00 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[20:2

civil penalties for recklessly spilling crude oil into Prince William
419
Sound.”
G. Appeal and Remand: Order for Reconsideration in Light of
State Farm v. Campbell
Exxon, apparently unsatisfied with the $1 billion reduction of
the $5 billion award, appealed the district court’s decision.420 The
plaintiffs, at the district court’s urging, cross-appealed, presumably
seeking to have the original verdict reinstated or to obtain a
421
smaller reduction. On August 18, 2003, before the parties even
submitted appellate briefs, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district
court’s judgment and remanded the case so that the district court
422
could reconsider the $4 billion award in light of State Farm, de423
cided by the Supreme Court in April 2003.
Exxon argued against a remand, pointing out that since a
challenge to the district court’s application of State Farm would require de novo review by the Ninth Circuit, a remand would be a
424
waste of judicial resources. The plaintiffs argued that the court
should remand again so that the district court could apply the State
425
Farm decision. The plaintiffs also argued that since Exxon would
likely make new arguments based on State Farm, a limited remand
426
to the district court was appropriate.
419. Id.
420. While the plaintiffs’ judgment continues to earn interest, Exxon long ago
posted a $6.75-billion supersedeas bond to cover the judgment, so it has little to
lose by seeking further reduction in the punitive damages award. Id. at 1050.
421. See id. at 1069 n.88 (stating: “[I]f Exxon chooses to take a further appeal
for the purpose of seeking a more generous reduction of the jury’s punitive damages award, then the court urges the plaintiffs to cross-appeal, for, if left to apply
BMW without the requirement that it effect some reduction of the $5 billion punitive damages award, this court would have . . . denied Exxon any relief whatever.”).
422. 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003).
423. See Exxon IV, No. 03-35166, at 1 (9th Cir. Aug. 18, 2003) (Order).
424. Exxon’s Letter Brief, Exxon II, 270 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2001) (Nos. 0335166, 03-35219).
425. Plaintiffs/Appellees-Cross-Appellants’ Letter Brief Concerning Suggestion to Remand this Appeal to the District Court in Light of State Farm Decision
at 1, Exxon IV (Nos. 03-35166, 03-35219).
426. Id. Exxon also argued that if the court decided to remand the case, the
judgment of the district court should be vacated so that Exxon would not continue
to incur the cost of the letter of credit it posted in order to stay execution of the
judgment during its appeal. Id. Exxon explained that “[c]ontinuing to post that
letter of credit costs Exxon approximately $19,750 per day or about $1.8 million
per quarter.” Id.
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On August 26, 2003, after learning of the remand, the district
court issued an order requesting that supplemental briefs from the
parties “shall provide the court with such additional arguments
427
The
based upon State Farm as the parties deem appropriate.”
district court’s order also established the brief and oral argument
428
schedule, which is slated to be completed before the end of 2003.
It is unlikely that the district court’s analysis of State Farm will
compel it to reduce the $5 billion punitive damages award further
than its previous $1 billion remittitur. As will be explained in Part
V, In re Exxon Valdez does not raise the issues of extraterritoriality
and multiple punishment—two problems paramount to the Supreme Court’s conclusion that the punitive damage award was ex429
cessive in State Farm.
Furthermore, in State Farm, the Supreme Court declined the
opportunity to impose a bright-line formula that courts could apply
430
when examining the ratio guidepost. Since the district court concluded that the total compensated harm was $507 million, a $4 billion punitive damages award would result in only a “single-digit
multiplier,” which the State Farm Court stated is “more likely to
431
Although
comport with due process” than a double-digit ratio.
the State Farm Court stated that “[w]hen compensatory damages
are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the outmost limit of the due process
guarantee[,]” it was also careful to note that the punitive damages
award “must be based upon the facts and circumstances” of the
case and not on comparisons to ratios that were upheld in dissimi432
lar cases. While the State Farm plaintiffs consisted of one family,
the In re Exxon Valdez plaintiffs number in the thousands. This
fact is likely to persuade the district court that a higher single-digit
ratio (such as eight to one or nine to one) is warranted in the case,
even though the compensated damages were substantial.

427. Exxon V, No. A89-0095-CV, at 2 (D. Alaska Aug. 26, 2003) (Order for
Further Proceedings on Punitive Damages Award).
428. Id.
429. See infra Part V.A.1; see also supra notes 150-171 and accompanying text.
430. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S.Ct 1513, 1524 (2003).
431. Id.
432. Id.
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V. IN RE EXXON VALDEZ: QUESTIONS RAISED (AND NOT
RAISED) REGARDING DUE PROCESS EXCESSIVENESS
REVIEW OF PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARDS
A. Questions Not Raised in In re Exxon Valdez: Extraterritoriality and Multiple Punishment
When examining the Ninth Circuit and the district court decisions in In re Exxon Valdez, two important issues relating to due
process excessiveness review are noticeably absent—extraterritoriality and the multiple punishment problem. These issues provided
the Supreme Court with added justification to overturn punitive
damages awards that it viewed as excessive in both BMW and State
433
Farm.
1. Extraterritoriality. According to the Supreme Court, both
defendants in BMW and State Farm were improperly subjected to
punitive damages awards that punished them for their companywide policies conducted outside the jurisdiction of the respective
434
Unlike the defendants in BMW and State Farm,
state courts.
Exxon was not punished for extraterritorial conduct unrelated to
its in-state conduct that caused specific harm to the plaintiffs.
BMW was premised in large part upon the Court’s requirement that punitive damages only be awarded to vindicate “legitimate interests”—which did not include punishing BMW for its law435
ful out-of-state conduct. BMW left open the question of whether
436
a state can punish a defendant for unlawful out-of-state conduct.
In the interim between BMW and State Farm, two circuit courts
addressed the issue and held that a defendant may not be punished
437
for unlawful extraterritorial conduct.
In State Farm, the Supreme Court followed suit and further
curtailed the State’s authority to impose punitive damages awards,
by deciding that Utah may not punish State Farm for unlawful ex438
traterritorial conduct. The Court vacated the punitive damages
award in large part because evidence was presented to the jury regarding unlawful acts committed by State Farm outside Utah that

433. See supra Parts II.C., II.E.
434. See BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572-74 (1996); State Farm, 123
S. Ct. at 1522-23.
435. BMW, 517 U.S. at 568.
436. OLSON, supra note 39, at 22.
437. See White v. Ford Motor Co., 312 F.3d. 998 (9th Cir. 2002); Continental
Trend Resources, Inc. v. OXY USA Inc., 101 F.3d 634 (10th Cir. 1996).
438. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1522.
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did not have a “nexus to the specific harm suffered by the plain439
tiff.” In other words, the Supreme Court found that extraterritorial evidence of a defendant’s reprehensible acts that are unrelated
to the harm done to a plaintiff “may not serve as the basis for puni440
tive damages.” This decision further reduces the risk that a state
will be able to punish a defendant for reprehensible acts committed
outside of its jurisdiction through the imposition of punitive damages awards.
2. The Multiple Punishment Problem. A second evolving issue that was absent from In re Exxon Valdez is whether due process is violated when a defendant is subjected to multiple punitive
damages awards because of “repeated imposition of punishment
441
As the district court
for the same act or course of conduct.”
pointed out, the creation of a mandatory punitive damages class
prevented Exxon from being subject to multiple punitive damages
442
awards.
A recent example of the multiple punishment problem sur443
faced in State Farm. In addition to the fair notice and extraterritorial aspects of the due process right, State Farm raised the issue of
whether—and at what point—a defendant’s due process rights are
violated when the party is subject to multiple punitive damages
awards arising in different cases, but stemming from the same con444
duct. That State Farm potentially faced multiple punitive damages awards for its fraudulent nationwide policies led the Court to
place restrictions on the use of evidence of lawful and unlawful out445
of-state conduct. Specifically, the Court stated that such out-ofstate conduct “must have a nexus to the specific harm suffered by
446
the plaintiff.”
While it had been rejected by many courts, a due process right
against multiple punitive damages awards was gaining ground even

439. Id.
440. Id. at 1523.
441. OLSON, supra note 39, at 21.
442. Exxon II, 270 F.3d 1215, 1225 (9th Cir. 2001); see generally Laura J. Hines,
Obstacles to Determining Punitive Damages In Class Actions, 36 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 889 (2001) (describing the procedural and substantive obstacles to resolving
punitive damages in class actions, including cases utilizing mandatory classes).
443. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1523; see also supra notes 157-160 and accompanying text.
444. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1523.
445. Id. at 1522-23.
446. Id. at 1522.
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prior to State Farm.447 In 1997, Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit, noted that the Supreme Court’s evolving due process
excessiveness jurisprudence threatened the traditional view that
448
multiple punitive damages awards do not violate due process.
Posner stated: “[I]t could be argued that a piling on of awards by
different courts for the same act might result in excessive punish449
Some commentators have suggested that a
ment for that act.”
constitutional prohibition on multiple punitive damages awards is a
logical extension of BMW; since punitive damages may only be imposed to further a state’s legitimate interests in punishment and deterrence and since previous punitive damages awards may already
have vindicated those interests, a state may sometimes be barred
450
from imposing any new punitive damages award. At some point
“the aggregate amount of multiple punitive awards may surpass a
451
constitutional threshold.” State Farm clarifies that use of evidence
of a defendant’s out-of-state conduct is quite limited—a decision
which should reduce the risk that a defendant will be subject to
multiple punitive damages awards stemming from the same conduct.
B. Questions Raised Regarding Due Process Excessiveness Review
In re Exxon Valdez raises many questions regarding due process excessiveness review. This Article points to many of them
452
when discussing the parties’ arguments and the courts’ decisions.
However, five other questions addressed below warrant more ex447. Thomas B. Colby, Beyond The Multiple Punishment Problem: Punitive
Damages As Punishment For Individual, Private Wrongs, 87 MINN. L. REV. 583,
587 (2003) (noting that “numerous cases and articles have wrestled with the question of whether and in what circumstances a state may subject a defendant to multiple punitive damages awards for the same conduct”); see also Owens-Corning
Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d 35, 48-50 (Tex. 1998) (providing a list of
cases with dicta suggesting that multiple punitive damages awards for the same
conduct is unconstitutional, when the total amount of punitive damages exceeds
the amount necessary to achieve the state’s legitimate interests in punishment and
deterrence). But see Dunn v. Hovic, 1 F.3d 1371, 1385-86 (3d Cir. 1993) (providing a list of decisions holding that multiple punitive damages awards stemming
from the same conduct are not unconstitutional).
448. In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 609
(7th Cir. 1997).
449. Id.; see also OLSON, supra note 39, at 21.
450. See Colby, supra note 447, at 651 n.257; see also BMW of N. Am., Inc. v.
Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996).
451. Owens-Corning, 972 S.W.2d at 51.
452. See supra Parts II., IV.
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tensive consideration. The first three of these questions suggest a
need for critical examination of the effects of the Supreme Court’s
due process excessiveness jurisprudence. The final two questions
raise issues that are likely to lead to further evolution of that jurisprudence.
1. Do BMW’s Guideposts Lead to Uniformity? The BMW
guideposts offer flexibility by allowing courts to determine whether
or not a given punitive damages award is excessive through a case453
In theory, this
by-case consideration of factual circumstances.
approach balances the reviewing court’s goal of vindicating the
state’s legitimate interests in punishment and deterrence with the
goal of imposing a punitive damages award that does not violate
the defendant’s due process right to fair notice. Since each case is
unique, a wide range of punitive damages awards will be upheld.
The Supreme Court, in rejecting strict mathematical formulas and
favoring flexibility, appears comfortable with the disparity in the
sizes and ratios of punitive damages that lower courts have upheld
in different cases. It is not the outcome of different cases that
should be uniform, but rather the excessiveness review itself, which
the Supreme Court attempted to provide when articulating the
454
BMW guideposts.
In re Exxon Valdez raises the question of whether the flexible
guideposts afford so much discretion that they undermine the goal
of uniformity. Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit applied
455
the BMW guideposts to the same case. The results of those excessiveness inquiries however, were far different: the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the $5 billion punitive damages award was so excessive that it violated Exxon’s due process right to fair notice; the district court concluded that the award was not excessive, but rather
456
fully justified and not in violation of any constitutional right. This
Article has provided a detailed description of the reasoning behind
each court’s excessiveness inquiry in order to show that application
457
of BMW’s guideposts can lead to opposite conclusions.

453. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
454. Mark A. Klugheit, “Where the Rubber Meets the Road”: Theoretical Justifications vs. Practical Outcomes in Punitive Damages Litigation, 52 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 803, 825 (2002) (“The three BMW guideposts were, undoubtedly, an attempt
to bring order, objectivity and some predictability to awards of punitive damages . . . by providing standards for judicial review.”).
455. Exxon II, 270 F.3d 1215, 1239-40 (9th Cir. 2001); Exxon III, 236 F. Supp.
2d 1043, 1068 (D. Alaska 2002).
456. Exxon II, 270 F.3d at 1242, 1246-47; Exxon III, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 1068.
457. See supra Parts IV.D.–IV.E.
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In re Exxon Valdez’s striking lack of uniformity in the application of the BMW guideposts is partially resolved by the de novo
standard of review dictated by the Supreme Court in Cooper In458
Thus, the Ninth
dustries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group Inc.
Circuit’s excessiveness review trumps the district court’s. However, while Cooper avoids a judicial impasse, it does nothing to resolve the underlying uniformity problem: courts may still reach
vastly different damages determinations from the same factual circumstances.
In a dissenting opinion in BMW, Justice Scalia stated:
[T]he ‘guideposts’ mark a road to nowhere . . . . The Court has
constructed a framework that does not genuinely constrain, that
does not inform state legislatures and lower courts—that does
nothing at all except confer an artificial air of doctrinal analysis
upon its essentially ad hoc determination that this particular
459
award of punitive damages was not ‘fair.’

As Justice Scalia implied, the broad question of whether or not a
punishment is fair is a subjective consideration. The BMW guideposts—especially the ratio and comparable sanctions guideposts—
offer a modest degree of mandatory objectivity for the specific
question of whether an award is so excessive that it deprives the
460
defendant of the due process right to fair notice. Since application of the guideposts is flexible, however, the initial subjective
consideration of fairness may erode what little objectivity is offered
by the guideposts. Some commentators suggest that the BMW
guideposts have provided at least a measure of uniformity and ob461
jectivity by giving courts guidance where none previously existed.
Others, however, have concluded that BMW has not resulted in
462
greater objectivity or precision. One commentator stated:
458. 532 U.S. 424, 436 (2001) (stating a de novo standard of review is proper
when reviewing a district court’s determination of the constitutionality of a punitive damages award).
459. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 605-06 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
460. See Jonathan Gross & Jeffrey D. Hayes, What Punitive Damages Message
is the U.S. Supreme Court Sending?, 69 DEF. COUNS. J. 447, 450 (2002) (describing
BMW’s reprehensibility guidepost and suggesting a strategy for defense counsel:
“There is no objective test for reprehensibility. Instead, it is a subjective conclusion, and good rhetorical skills can influence the outcome of this decision. In addition, a punitive damages defendant should make a record at trial of any mitigating factors that later can be argued on appeal. An example comes from the
Exxon Valdez case.”).
461. Turner, supra note 55, at 449 (stating that BMW “instilled a modicum of
order into the previous chaos”).
462. Klugheit, supra note 454, at 826.
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Since the Supreme Court has not offered its own guidance on
how its three BMW factors . . . are to be applied, it is these state
and federal decisions arising out of post-BMW remands that illustrate the consequences of BMW for the real world . . . [which]
remain, much as before, replete with opportunity for inconsis463
tency, irrationality, and uncertainty.

While the guideposts may not lead to uniformity and objectivity, they at least focus a court’s due process excessiveness review.
In addition, each due process excessiveness case that reaches the
Supreme Court offers a fresh opportunity for the court to further
refine the BMW analysis and provide further parameters for lower
courts. The Court’s recent decision in State Farm illustrates that
the due process jurisprudence is not static. Future appellate and
Supreme Court decisions will likely continue to refine BMW’s
guideposts and add to the due process excessiveness inquiry in a
way that increases uniformity. Increased guidance, however,
comes at a price. As Justice Ginsburg noted in her State Farm dissent, the flexible guideposts prescribed in BMW have been swiftly
464
converted into instructions that resemble “marching orders.” Increasing guidance erodes the respect and restraint usually accorded
465
to the states’ determinations regarding punitive damages.
2. Is De Novo Review Appropriate? In Cooper, the Supreme
Court resolved a circuit split concerning whether the abuse of discretion or the de novo standard should be applied when an appellate court reviews a district court’s determination of the constitu466
The Cooper Court held
tionality of a punitive damages award.
467
that the de novo standard should be applied. The Court justified
its holding by stating that “[c]onsiderations of institutional competence fail to tip the balance in favor of deferential appellate re468
view.” The Court stated that district courts only have an advantage over courts of appeals when examining BMW’s
reprehensibility guidepost, “and even then the advantage exists
primarily with respect to issues turning on witness credibility and
469
demeanor.” The Court then stated that both trial and appellate

463. Id. at 832.
464. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1531 (2003)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
465. Id.
466. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 431
(2001).
467. Id. at 436.
468. Id. at 440.
469. Id.
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courts are equally capable of analyzing BMW’s ratio guidepost.470
Finally, the Court concluded that the appellate courts were better
suited to analyze the comparable sanctions guidepost, since it calls
471
for broad legal comparisons.
In re Exxon Valdez offers a striking example of a district court
and an appellate court reaching far different conclusions after
analyzing the BMW guideposts. Each court conducted its analysis
utilizing different underlying premises regarding the guideposts
themselves. In other words, the application of the guideposts was
not uniform. Perhaps more importantly, even when the separate
inquiries were alike, the courts reached opposite conclusions regarding the constitutionality of the punitive damages award.
In re Exxon Valdez raises the question of whether a de novo
review is appropriate. If the appellate courts have superior competence to conduct an excessiveness inquiry based on BMW’s guideposts—as the Court implicitly held in Cooper—one should be able
to point to specific aspects of the two excessiveness inquiries of In
re Exxon Valdez in order to show that superiority. First, where did
the district court’s analysis fall short? Second, how did the appellate court provide a more insightful analysis of BMW’s guideposts?
Although the differences in the courts’ respective inquiries can
readily be pointed out—as this Article has done—it is more difficult to find reasons why considerations of institutional competence
favor the appellate court by looking at In re Exxon Valdez.
If the excessiveness review in a given case hinges on the reprehensibility guidepost, perhaps the district court’s excessiveness inquiry should be given greater deference than the de novo standard
provides. After all, the Cooper Court stated that reprehensibility
was best analyzed by the district court. Arguably, reprehensibility
was the most important guidepost in In re Exxon Valdez. If institutional competence favors letting the district court decide, why
should de novo review supplant the more competent analysis of the
district court with the less competent analysis of the appellate
court?
As previously discussed, the excessiveness inquiry is necessarily somewhat arbitrary and subjective due to the flexibility inherent
in the guideposts themselves. De novo review, however, should do
more than substitute the appellate court’s analysis of the BMW
guideposts for that of the district court. If de novo review is the
appropriate standard, one should be able to see how it facilitates a
more insightful and accurate assessment of the constitutionality of

470. Id.
471. Id.
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a given punitive damages award. When examining the excessiveness inquiries conducted in In re Exxon Valdez, it is unclear
whether de novo review achieved these aims. On the other hand,
over time de novo review may offer the advantage of more consistent application of the BMW guideposts, especially as the requirements and limitations of the due process excessiveness inquiry are
472
further refined.
3. Does Excessiveness Review Needlessly Undermine the Role
of the Jury? De novo review provides a greater check on the jury’s
determination of punitive damages awards (and the trial court’s
subsequent review of the award) than the abuse of discretion stan473
When adopting de novo review, the Cooper Court addard.
dressed concerns that de novo review infringes on the Seventh
474
The Cooper Court reasoned
Amendment right to a jury trial.
that the jury’s determination of the appropriate amount of punitive
damages is not a finding of fact, which would implicate the Seventh
475
Specifically, the Court
Amendment’s Reexamination Clause.
stated that “[a] jury’s assessment of [compensatory damages] is essentially a factual determination, whereas its imposition of punitive
476
damages is an expression of its moral condemnation.” In addition, the Court stated that as the types of compensatory damages
available have increased, punitive damages have come to serve “a
477
more purely punitive (and therefore less factual)” purpose. The
Cooper Court also stated that determination of the amount necessary to achieve deterrence is not a pure question of fact since the
jury may legitimately have broader concerns than simply economi478
cally optimum deterrence.
Justice Ginsburg, the lone dissenter in Cooper, argued that
only the abuse of discretion standard should be applied since the
“jury’s verdict on punitive damages is fundamentally dependent on

472. But see Lisa M. White, A Wrong Turn on the Road to Tort Reform: The
Supreme Court’s Adoption of De Novo Review in Cooper Industries v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 68 BROOK. L. REV. 885, 921-23 (2003) (concluding that de
novo review will not provide different results than the abuse of discretion standard and stating that the abuse of discretion standard is sufficiently rigorous to
scrutinize excessive punitive damages awards).
473. See Cooper, 532 U.S. at 436.
474. Id. at 437; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
475. Cooper, 532 U.S. at 437; see also Leading Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 306,
359 (2001).
476. Cooper, 532 U.S. at 432.
477. Id. at 438 n.11.
478. Id. at 439.
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determinations we characterize as factfindings.”479 Justice Ginsburg
pointed out that the determination of a punitive damages award is
no less factual than a determination of non-economic compensatory awards such as pain and suffering: “Both derive their meaning
from a set of underlying facts as determined by a jury. If one exercise in quantification is properly regarded as factfinding . . . it
480
seems to me the other should be so regarded as well.” The factual bases underlying a punitive damages award include “the extent
of harm or potential harm caused by the defendant’s misconduct,
whether the defendant acted in good faith, whether the misconduct
was an individual instance or part of a broader pattern, [and]
whether the defendant behaved negligently, recklessly, or mali481
ciously.”
The Cooper Court enumerated the following factors that the
jury had been instructed to consider: (1) the character of the defendant’s conduct; (2) the defendant’s motive; (3) the amount necessary to achieve specific and general deterrence; and (4) the de482
The Court then stated that,
fendant’s income and assets.
“Although the jury’s application of these instructions may have depended on specific findings of fact, nothing in our decision today
suggests that the Seventh Amendment would permit a court, in reviewing a punitive damages award, to disregard such jury find483
ings.”
In re Exxon Valdez raises the question of the extent of the
jury’s role in determining punitive damages and whether that role
has been needlessly undermined by an excessiveness inquiry conducted under the de novo standard of review. If the jury made specific findings of fact in applying these instructions when determining the amount of punitive damages, is it proper for a reviewing
court to disregard those factual findings? As the district court
pointed out, the In re Exxon Valdez jury was given explicit instructions regarding the factors they were to consider, which presciently
484
Specifically, the district court
mirrored BMW’s guideposts.
charged the jury that: (1) the purposes of a punitive damages award
are punishment and deterrence; (2) it could not arbitrarily set the
amount of the award; (3) the award must have a rational basis in
the record; (4) the award must bear a reasonable relationship to
the harm done or be likely to result from the defendant’s conduct;
479.
480.
481.
482.
483.
484.

Id. at 446 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 446-47 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 446.
Id. at 439 n.12.
Id. (citations omitted).
Exxon III, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1053 (D. Alaska 2002).
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(5) the award should reflect the reprehensibility of the defendant’s
conduct; and (6) it could consider whether prior payments and
485
sanctions mitigated that reprehensibility.
If a jury is instructed in a manner that incorporates BMW’s
guideposts, query whether its punitive damages award—arguably
based on a series of factual determinations—should be disregarded
as long as it is not a result that “no reasonable juror” would reach.
For example, if the jury is informed about BMW’s “hierarchy of
reprehensibility” and the range of punitive-to-harm ratios that
have been upheld in similar cases, and it is provided with a laundry
list of the sanctions available for comparable conduct, does it make
sense to disregard the jury’s final determination of the appropriate
level of punitive damages, which are based on these underlying factual determinations?
Although writing long before the BMW guideposts were articulated, Justice O’Connor, in her dissenting opinion in Haslip,
criticized the broad discretion given to juries, stating that “[w]hile I
do not question the general legitimacy of punitive damages, I see a
strong need to provide juries with standards to constrain their discretion so that they may exercise their power wisely, not capri486
ciously or maliciously.” On the other hand, at least one observer
has concluded that additional jury instructions will fail to produce
fewer excessive punitive damages awards since jurors often have
487
difficulty with their instructions.
Perhaps the distinction between procedural and substantive
due process rights helps resolve this issue. As one scholar explained, “Procedural due process requires that there be safeguards
such as instructions to the jury to guide their discretion, and judicial review to assure the reasonableness of the awards. Substantive
due process prevents excessive punitive damages awards, regard488
less of the procedures followed.” While the instructions the district court gave to the In re Exxon Valdez jury may have fully protected Exxon’s procedural due process rights, they still may have
failed to protect Exxon’s substantive due process right against excessive punitive damages awards.
Nonetheless, it is difficult to see why a defendant’s substantive
due process right cannot be protected when the district court reviews the jury award under the “no reasonable juror” standard, or
485. Id.
486. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 43 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
487. Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Determining Punitive Damages: Empirical Insights and Implications for Reform, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 103, 190 (2002).
488. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 420.
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if necessary, when an appellate court applies an abuse of discretion
standard when reviewing the district court’s excessiveness inquiry.
A constitutionally excessive punitive damages award should not
489
survive these reviews. The higher de novo standard may needlessly allow an appellate court to substitute its own factually based
determination of the appropriate amount of punitive damages for
that of the jury.
Some commentators have suggested the more radical solution
of splitting the responsibilities over punitive damage determina490
Under one proposal the
tions between the judge and the jury.
jury would have the duty to make the underlying factual determinations, including the appropriateness of punitive damages, the
level of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, and the rela491
tive wealth of the defendant. The trial judge would then determine the amount of punitive damages necessary to achieve punishment and deterrence, while ensuring that the award is not
constitutionally excessive—a determination that is a question of
492
law. The jury’s factual determinations would be afforded deference under the abuse of discretion standard, while the judge’s
493
award would be subject to de novo review.
Further evolution of the due process excessiveness jurisprudence may resolve issues regarding the proper role of the jury in
determining punitive damages awards. Even if the current framework has the consequence of taking punitive damages award determinations away from the jury due to fearful trial judges who
simply order remittiturs rather than face de novo review, the present Supreme Court is unlikely to reverse its holding in Cooper.
489. Of course, Cooper proves the opposite by showing that at least some punitive damages awards will survive the abuse of discretion review and fail the de
novo review. The Ninth Circuit initially upheld the punitive damage under an
abuse of discretion review, Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.,
532 U.S. 424, 431 (2001), and subsequently reduced the award under a de novo review after the Supreme Court remanded the case to the circuit court to apply the
heightened standard, Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 285
F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2002). See supra notes 114-122 and accompanying text.
490. Lisa Litwiller, Has the Supreme Court Sounded the Death Knell for Jury
Assessed Punitive Damages? A Critical Re-Examination of the American Jury, 36
U.S.F. L. REV. 411, 470-71 (2002) (providing an historical summary of punitive
damages and the relative power of the judge and jury in awarding them); see also
Paul Mogin, Why Judges, Not Juries, Should Set Punitive Damages, 65 U. CHI. L.
REV. 179 (1998) (arguing that the power to set punitive damages in federal court
should rest with trial judges, subject to appellate review, rather than with juries).
491. Litwiller, supra note 490, at 470-71.
492. Id. at 470.
493. Id. at 471.
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Subsequent decisions, however, may create additional jury instruction requirements and may refine how a well-instructed jury’s determination should be reviewed. Finally, the more radical proposal
discussed above is not inconceivable; purely factual findings could
be reserved for the jury, while judges could be given exclusive
494
authority to determine the amount of punitive damages awards.
4. Is the Defendant’s Wealth A Relevant Consideration? As
previously discussed, the BMW Court articulated three guideposts
to be considered when a court determines whether a punitive damages award is constitutionally excessive: (1) reprehensibility of the
defendant’s conduct; (2) the ratio of the award to the harm; and (3)
495
comparison to other sanctions. However, neither BMW, Cooper,
nor State Farm states that these are the only guideposts that can be
considered.
In re Exxon Valdez raises the question of whether additional
guideposts can or should be considered when courts conduct their
excessiveness inquiries. Most notably, In re Exxon Valdez asks
whether the jury can consider the wealth of the defendant. In addition, the case raises the closely related question of whether courts
should consider the wealth of the defendant when reviewing the
jury’s punitive damages award to determine whether it is so excessive that it violates the defendant’s substantive due process rights.
Most courts allow the jury to consider the defendant’s wealth
496
Evidence
when it determines the amount of punitive damages.
regarding a defendant’s wealth is introduced to prove whether the
defendant has sufficient financial resources to pay a large award
and to show whether such an award is necessary to punish and de497
ter the defendant. Some observers have argued that permitting
juries to consider wealth is unwise, irrational, and unconstitutional
since a defendant should be punished for the harm in question, and
498
not simply for being wealthy. Critics of evidence relating to a de-

494. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals now directs district court
judges to perform a more stringent review upon a motion for remittitur of punitive
damages awards by independently assessing how much a defendant should be
punished when the award rests on a policy judgment as opposed to a factual determination. Atlas Food Sys. & Serv. v. Crane Nat’l Vendors, Inc. 99 F.3d 587,
594-95 (4th Cir. 1996).
495. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575-85 (1996).
496. See Klugheit, supra note 454, at 839.
497. Id.
498. Kenneth S. Abraham & John C. Jeffries, Jr., Punitive Damages and the
Rule of Law: The Role of the Defendant’s Wealth, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 415, 423
(1989) (“Punishment based on the characteristics of the actor, rather than on spe-
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fendant’s wealth also argue that no greater deterrence is needed
for more wealthy defendants since both wealthy and poor defendants conduct the same cost-benefit analysis when determining
whether or not to engage in an activity, and the threat of liability
499
will equally deter both. On the other hand, those in favor of allowing juries to consider the wealth of a defendant argue that it is
necessary “to assure that a punitive damages award is sufficient to
500
punish the defendant and deter future wrongful conduct.”
In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, the Supreme
Court upheld the guideposts used by the Alabama Supreme Court
to review a jury’s punitive damages award, one of which was “the
501
‘financial position’ of the defendant.” In TXO Production Corp.
v. Alliance Resource Corp., the Supreme Court upheld the jury’s
award of punitive damages after the trial court had instructed the
jury that it could consider the wealth of the defendant as a factor
502
when determining the amount of punitive damages. The Court
noted that the defendant had failed to properly raise the issue of
whether the jury instruction regarding the defendant’s wealth vio503
lated due process. In dicta, the Court stated that “the emphasis
on the wealth of the wrongdoer increased the risk that the award
may have been influenced by prejudice against large corpora504
The TXO Court, however, also reiterated its position
tions.”
from Haslip that the wealth of the defendant is a factor that can be
505
taken into account when assessing punitive damages.
cific misconduct, threatens fundamental notions of freedom from government
constraint.”).
499. See Schwartz, supra note 27, at 1022-23; see also Polinsky & Shavell, supra
note 91, at 911 (stating that the wealth of corporate defendants should never be a
factor in assessing punitive damages and should only rarely be a factor with individual defendants).
500. Michael J. Pepek, TXO v. Alliance: Due Process Limits and Introducing a
Defendant’s Wealth When Determining Punitive Damages Awards, 25 PAC. L.J.
1191, 1224 (1994).
501. 499 U.S. 1, 22 (1990).
502. 509 U.S. 443, 466 (1993). For an overview of the TXO decision, see supra
notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
503. TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 464.
504. Id. Others have stated that “consideration of the wealth of large corporations may only aggravate the problems with jury decisionmaking . . . .” Klugheit,
supra note 454, at 840.
505. TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 464. In a dissenting opinion, Justice
O’Connor accepted that “the defendant’s wealth is a permissible consideration”
for the jury, but warned that “courts must have authority to recognize the special
danger of bias that such considerations create.” Id. at 492 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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The BMW Court chose not to articulate the defendant’s
wealth as one of its excessiveness guideposts, even though the Haslip Court upheld an excessiveness inquiry that included the defen506
Instead, the BMW Court focused on
dant’s wealth as a factor.
the substantive due process right which “dictate[s] that a person receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to
punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may
507
impose.” BMW’s wealth was simply not a factor the Court considered when it sought to determine whether the large punitive
damage award had violated the substantive due process right of fair
notice. Specifically, the Court stated that “the fact that BMW is a
large corporation rather than an impecunious individual does not
508
diminish its entitlement to fair notice.”
In State Farm, the Supreme Court rejected the Utah Supreme
Court’s use of State Farm’s wealth as a justification for the large
509
While the Court did not reject the
punitive damages award.
jury’s use of the defendant’s wealth when determining the punitive
damages award and did not expressly state that the defendant’s
wealth has no place in a due process excessiveness inquiry, the
Court reiterated its position from BMW, stating that “[t]he wealth
of a defendant cannot justify an otherwise unconstitutional puni510
tive damages award.”
Some district courts have seized upon the omission of the defendant’s wealth from BMW’s guideposts and have concluded that
511
evidence of a defendant’s wealth cannot be offered at trial.
These courts erroneously fail to distinguish between use of the defendant’s wealth as a consideration in the assessment of punitive
damages, and use of the defendant’s wealth as a guidepost in determining whether a punitive damages award is so excessive that it
violates due process. Since the Supreme Court has not prohibited
either of these uses of a defendant’s wealth, prohibiting such evidence at trial seems wildly premature absent applicable legislation
or a decision by a higher court.
It is fully consistent to allow evidence of a defendant’s wealth
to be used by the jury when it determines the amount of punitive
506. See Klugheit, supra note 454, at 840 (stating that BMW gives “defendants
at least some basis to argue that their wealth should not be considered at all by the
jury in assessing punitive damages”).
507. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996).
508. Id. at 585.
509. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1525 (2003).
510. Id.
511. See, e.g., Pivot Point Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 932 F. Supp. 220,
223 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (Easterbrook, J., sitting by designation).
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damages, yet prohibit reviewing courts from using the same evidence as a guidepost when conducting an excessiveness review.
Evidence of the defendant’s wealth is relevant as the jury determines the amount necessary to punish and deter a particular defendant. A court conducting an excessiveness review, however,
must protect the defendant’s substantive due process right to fair
notice and should not be overly concerned with the amount necessary to punish and deter. If the reviewing court concludes that the
defendant did not have fair notice of the punishment that could be
imposed for the conduct that harmed the plaintiff, the court must
reduce the punitive damages award. Neither the wealth of the defendant, nor the likelihood that a reduced amount would insufficiently punish and deter the defendant should change this outcome.
The constitutional maximum punitive damages award in a given
case is based on fair notice, not on notions of what is necessary to
punish and deter the defendant.
5. Should a Defendant’s Expenses Mitigate the Amount of
Punitive Damages? While BMW’s guideposts have served to focus
the excessiveness inquiry now required to protect the defendant’s
substantive due process right to fair notice, the lack of guidance
provided to lower courts on how to apply the guideposts has created conflicts, as the following example demonstrates. One of the
biggest sources of disagreement between the Ninth Circuit and the
district court concerned how Exxon’s various spill-related expenditures should affect analysis of the BMW guideposts and the extent
to which these expenditures should mitigate the amount of the punitive damages award.
The Ninth Circuit contended that the spill-related expenditures should be factored into the BMW excessiveness inquiry and
should serve to discount the amount of punitive damages. When
the Ninth Circuit analyzed the case under BMW’s reprehensibility
guidepost, it stated that Exxon’s pre-trial payments mitigated the
512
The court stated that
reprehensibility of its conduct.
“[r]eprehensibility should be discounted if defendants act promptly
and comprehensively to ameliorate any harm they cause in order to
513
When examining
encourage such socially beneficial behavior.”
the ratio guidepost, the Ninth Circuit stated that these pre-trial
payments should not be used as part of the harm estimate for purposes of calculating the ratio “because that would deter settlements
514
The Ninth Circuit also reasoned that the
prior to judgment.”
512. Exxon II, 270 F.3d 1215, 1242-43 (9th Cir. 2001).
513. Id. at 1242.
514. Id. at 1244.
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cleanup costs, casualty losses, fines, settlements, and compensatory
judgments “should be considered part of the deterrent already imposed” for the spill under the ratio guidepost in order to avoid
515
over-deterrence.
The district court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s approach and
concluded that Exxon’s spill-related expenditures should not miti516
gate the amount of the punitive damages award. Specifically, the
district court stated that payments made prior to judgment should
517
be included when calculating the harm side of the ratio. The district court stated that the Ninth Circuit’s approach would actually
518
In addition, the district
encourage trials and deter settlements.
court contended that since the jury had already been permitted to
use Exxon’s spill-related expenditures to mitigate its calculation of
the amount of the punitive damages award, a reviewing court conducting an excessiveness inquiry should not deduct those expendi519
tures a second time in the ratio analysis.
Since one of the purposes of punitive damages is deterrence, it
is clearly relevant for a jury to consider the amounts a defendant
has paid as a result of its harmful conduct when determining the
appropriate amount of an award. However, the extent to which a
reviewing court conducting an excessiveness inquiry should use
pre-trial expenditures to reduce the level of reprehensibility of the
defendant’s conduct and to reduce the harm side of the ratio analysis is a more difficult assessment. The purpose of the excessiveness
inquiry is to determine whether the punitive damages award is so
excessive that it violates the defendant’s substantive due process
right to fair notice. BMW’s guideposts exist to help determine
whether a defendant had fair notice of the punishment that could
be imposed for the conduct that harmed the plaintiff. Under the
guideposts, when a defendant’s conduct is highly reprehensible,
when the difference between the harm and the punitive damages
award is small, and when comparable sanctions could have been
imposed for the conduct, a reviewing court should conclude that
the defendant’s right to fair notice has not been violated.
Considerations of whether the punitive damages award has resulted in economically optimum deterrence or whether the combination of pre-trial expenditures and the punitive damages award
have resulted in over-deterrence are distinct from the fair notice
excessiveness inquiry required by BMW and its progeny. A court
515.
516.
517.
518.
519.

Id.
Exxon III, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1060 (D. Alaska 2002).
Id.
Id. at 1061.
Id.
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conducting such a review should not be overly concerned with
whether the jury has determined the precise amount necessary to
deter the defendant’s conduct. Since punishment is an equal goal
of punitive damages, a reviewing court should not focus exclusively
on saving a defendant from over-deterrence, for, as the Cooper
Court pointed out, society’s interest in punishment and deterrence
520
may override its interest in economic efficiency.
The difficulty is that in order to determine the fair notice issue,
a reviewing court must assess the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct and calculate the harm that the conduct caused. Ignoring subsequent remedial measures taken by a defendant does
not provide a complete picture of the defendant’s reprehensibility.
A defendant who takes prompt measures to reduce the harm
caused by its conduct is clearly less reprehensible than a defendant
who does nothing. Similarly, the calculation of the harm caused by
the defendant’s conduct as required under the ratio analysis necessarily involves including some harms and excluding others.
The In re Exxon Valdez jury was instructed that it could decide whether Exxon’s spill-related expenditures properly mitigated
the need for punishment and deterrence. In other words, the jury
was allowed to use these expenditures to offset its determination of
the appropriate amount of the punitive damages award. Under
these circumstances, a court conducting an excessiveness review to
determine the fair notice issue should not use the expenditures to
reduce the defendant’s liability for punitive damages under BMW’s
guideposts, since the jury already had a chance to do so. While
BMW’s guideposts themselves add difficulty, a reviewing court
should attempt to focus on the fair notice issue to the extent possible and should avoid simply substituting its own subjective notion
of the amount necessary to punish and deter the defendant for that
of the jury. Under the current due process excessiveness jurisprudence, as long as the defendant had fair notice, the award cannot
be deemed unconstitutional, even if the reviewing court concludes
that the award may result in over-deterrence.
VI. CONCLUSION
In re Exxon Valdez provides an opportunity to examine application of the Supreme Court’s recent decisions regarding the substantive due process right against excessive punitive damages
awards. Procedurally, the case has progressed during a period of
rapidly evolving due process excessiveness jurisprudence. The case
520. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 439-40
(2001).

111103 CHAMBERS.DOC

2003]

12/29/03 2:00 PM

IN RE EXXON VALDEZ

269

raises several questions regarding the effects of that jurisprudence
and points to problematic issues which may lead to further evolution.
As troublesome aspects of due process excessiveness review
reach the Supreme Court, the Court will undoubtedly continue to
provide additional guidance regarding BMW’s guideposts and the
manner in which they are to be analyzed. Further guidance, however, is likely to erode the authority of the states to determine the
allowable scope of punitive damages, to decrease deference appellate courts give to trial courts, and to diminish the role of the jury.
The perceived benefits of the excessiveness inquiry—uniformity
and predictability—have not yet materialized. While the Supreme
Court has succeeded in prescribing a uniform analysis for determining whether a punitive damages award is constitutionally excessive, the practical application—as illustrated by In re Exxon Valdez—has proved problematic. Whether evolution of the due
process excessiveness jurisprudence will clear up these problems,
or whether the Supreme Court, in its determination to rein in punitive damages awards, will create additional problems through further guidance, remains to be seen.

